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workers bear a larger burden from trade liberalization when capital is more foot-
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this changes their response to tariff protection. I combine worker level data for
the US, with industry level data on openness and other industry characteristics
for the years 1990 to 1996. The results suggest that unions do face a threat from
FDI, though this threat effect is not large in comparison to other industry char-
acteristics. I also find evidence that union response to tariff changes vary with
the level of the threat effect. Our results suggest that unions use protection to
raise employment probability in low threat industries, and to raise premiums in
high threat industries.
ESSAYS ON LABOR MARKET EFFECTS




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland at College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Arvind Panagariya, Chairman/Advisor
Professor Nuno Lim o
Professor Peter Murrell
Professor Daniel R. Vincent





To my wife, Shilpa
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My heartfelt gratitude to Professor Arvind Panagariya, whose guid-
ance and encouragement have been invaluable. I also wish to thank
Prof. Lim o and the other members of my committee, Prof. Mur-





2 Labor Market Effects of Integration in a Unionized Economy 10
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 A model of a unionized economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Effects of enhanced Capital Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 Price Changes in an Integrated Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5 Conclusions and further research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 An Empirical Study of the effects of Integration on Union Wage
Premiums 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Specification and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4 Appendices 71
5 Tables and Figures 74
iv
 v
LIST OF TABLES 
  
 
Table1: Direct investment flows, OECD countries, 1998-2001 (billion US dollars) 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Industries with the Largest and Smallest Union Premiums 
 
Table 3: Industry Classification 
 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
  
Figure 1: Equilibrium in the Model 
  
Figure 2: Effect of a fall in mobility costs on labor demand 
  
Figure 3: Effects of Capital Mobility when Firms Sell Capital in International     
Markets 
  
Figure 4: Effects of Capital Mobility when Firms Import Capital: Effect on Wages 
   Depends on Volume of Capital Imports 
  
Figure 5: Effects of Price Decline when the Domestic Capital Supply Curve is 
Relatively Inelastic 
 
Figure 6: Changes in the share of Domestic Capital in Total Capital over time 
 
Figure 7: Changes in the Average Union Premium over time   
 





The past few decades have seen many countries around the world becoming more
closely connected with each other through the forces of trade and investment.
Declining trade barriers since the 1970s have led to closer integration of coun-
tries’ product markets, and a rapid expansion of international trade. Since the
1980s there has also been a spurt in foreign direct investment, leading to pro-
duction becoming internationalized in many industries. This has been facilitated
both by falling legal barriers to such investment in many countries, as well as
improvements in transport and communication technology. Such integration has
generated a lot of benefits for participating countries, but like any change, it has
also given rise to its own set of concerns.
One particular concern has been the manner in which globalization has af-
fected workers. While labor has not been afforded the same degree of interna-
tional mobility as is available to goods or capital, it is clear that globalization has
had a significant impact on labor markets. The channels through which workers
have been affected, and the extent to which they have benefited or been hurt are
not well understood. However the fear that they have been adversely affected
has gained popularity, especially in the industrialized economies. For workers in
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many OECD countries, particularly unskilled workers, the past few decades have
been distressful. In some countries, especially the US and UK, wage growth has
slowed down (Bosworth and Perry, 1994; Mishel and Bernstein, 1994), and has
also become more unequal. In others, unemployment has risen. There is also
some evidence of an increase in wage volatility (Gottschalk and Moffit, 1994).
The concurrence of these events with increasing openness has led many to be-
lieve that globalization is to blame. This belief has often been used to make a
case against integration.
Support for this proposition is, however, limited. Traditional trade models
could be used to argue that trade could hurt workers in capital abundant in-
dustrialized countries by reducing domestic wages.1 However this effect operates
through changes in factor demands induced by changes in relative goods prices,
and empirical research suggests that openness to trade operating through this
channel could have had little effect on wages.2 Other empirical research has
examined the effect of trade protection on wages (for example Harrison and Re-
venga, 1995; Gaston and Trefler, 1994, 1995; MacPherson and Stewart, 1990),
the impact of foreign ownership on wages ( as Driffield, 1999), and of trade on
1See Bhagwati (2000)
2Evidence for US comes from Revenga (1992) who finds that changes in import prices have
a small effect on wages. Other studies have focussed on the prediction that an increase in
international competition from countries abundant in unskilled labor should be reflected in lower
prices for products utilizing such labor intensively. Several such price studies have, however,
found little evidence that trade contributed to the larger relative price increases for skilled-labor
intensive products compared to unskilled-labor intensive products that would be consistent with
a decline in the wages of unskilled workers (Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Krugman, 1995;
Leamer; 1996; Neven and Wypolosz, 1996). See Slaughter and Swagel, 1997 for survey
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job displacements (see Kletzer, 1998). The results from most of these studies
generally point towards integration having a relatively small effect on wages and
employment.3 Similarly, it is not clear that closer integration of capital markets
should necessarily hurt workers. Indeed, when such integration promotes more
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country, it may benefit workers by creating
new jobs and raising wages.4 Since most FDI in the world both originates and
ends up in the OECD countries themselves, and many member countries are net
recipients of FDI (see Table 1), it is difficult to conclude that capital mobility
has hurt workers in all these countries.
At the same time, globalization can have labor market impacts beyond simply
shifting the labor demand across industries. It can also affect them through its
effect on institutions which impact wage determination. Labor markets are often
characterized by non competitive wage setting, where such institutions play an
important role. One important example are labor unions. Studies in the US, for
example, point towards large and persistent inter-industry differentials in wages
earned by seemingly equivalent workers. While there is no consensus over what
these differentials represent, at least in some industries like automobiles and steel,
3Indeed Slaughter and Swagel (1997) note that though ”the average estimate of trade on
wages and employment is not zero.but it is certainly lower than what might be expected from
purely anecdotal evidence, and certainly far from the claim that import competition makes a
giant sucking sound.”
4Bhagwati (1999), for example, cites the case of Interstate 85 in North Carolina where the
loss of employment due to the decline of the traditional textile industry has been more than
made up by the influx of new foreign firms. Sturgeon and Florida (1997) note that while the
globalization of production by the big three US companies has contributed to job losses in the
important automobile industry in the US, it has also promoted new investments by Japanese
manufacturers, which have benefited workers by adding new jobs.
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these might reflect rent seeking by organized labor unions. Labor unions remain
important in many industrialized economies, though unionization rates have been
falling in many cases. They play an important role in wage determination in many
key industries, and are widely assumed to raise wages for their members above
their competitive level. They also enhance labor welfare in other ways. 5
Casual observation suggests that unions are deeply affected by integration,
since they have often been active in campaigning against it.6. Theory also sug-
gests that unions may be more vulnerable to integration for many reasons. Not
only could they be affected through the conventional channel of an inward shift
in their sector’s labor demand curve (on account of increased competition from
abroad), but increasing openness could also erode their ability to secure rents for
their members. In part this may be because integration gives firms the opportu-
nity to shift production and capital abroad more easily, beyond the grip of local
unions. This “threat effect” could lead unions to lower their wage demands. At
the same time, a lowered labor demand could also put higher pressures on unions
to reduce wages closer to their competitive level to maintain employment. Rodrik
(1998) suggests that the channel through which globalization puts more pressure
5Unions play a role in reducing inequality by standardizing wages among workers, and com-
pressing wage differentials across different skill classes (Kahn, 2000). Evidence that declining
unionization has played a role in increasing wage inequality in the US comes from Freeman
(1993) and Card (1998), who find that roughly about a fifth of the total rise in inequality can
be attributed to declining union power. They also play an important welfare enhancing role
by protecting workers from abuse or victimization, and monitoring health, safety and other
working conditions.
6In the US, for example, the AFL-CIO campaigned hard to prevent the ratification of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and against granting trade negotiation au-
thority to President Clinton. It has also been active in protests against the WTO.
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on unions is through making the labor demand elasticity they face more elastic.
Integration makes domestic labor more easily substitutable with foreign factors,
raises the domestic elasticity of demand, and reduces the bargaining power of
workers. This suggests that if a large part of the labor force is unionized, or
if unions are located in key sectors which affect wage determination elsewhere,
globalization may have a larger effect on wages and employment than would be
suggested by conventional trade models which assume competitive labor markets.
My thesis examines the effect of integration on wages in unionized markets.
The first half of my thesis theoretically examines Rodrik’s proposition that glob-
alization increases the elasticity of the labor demand curve facing unions. 7
Assuming that such changes in elasticity are the channel through which unions
are affected, I examine in a general equilibrium setting how increased integration
of a country’s product and capital markets into the world economy affects unions
and wages. I model a two-sector economy where one of the sectors is unionized.
The union is able to set sectoral wages because of its position as a monopoly
supplier of labor. The unionized sector also utilizes capital as one of the factors
of production. Increasing union wages comes at the cost of reducing union jobs,
with the cost being higher, the cheaper it is for firms to move capital abroad.
Unlike previous work, I model capital mobility explicitly in terms of mobility
costs, which restrict the extent to which capital (in the sense of direct foreign
investment) can move across borders in response to the difference between its
returns at home and abroad. The advantage of this definition is that I am also
7Labor demand is interpreted as sectoral labor demand, and not national labor demand as in
Leamer (1995) and Panagariya (1999). For a discussion of the impact of openness on national
labor demand see Panagariya (1999).
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able to account for the effects induced by the movement of capital in or out of the
domestic economy, since this is bound to affect the general wage when the union-
ized sector is large. Workers choose between joining the union and being eligible
for a higher paying union job albeit with some probability of finding themselves
unemployed and being forced to shift, or joining the lower paying non-unionized
sector but with certainty of employment. Both union wages and membership are
endogenously determined.
In the model, economic integration is modeled in terms of reduced barriers to
product trade, or easier factor (capital) mobility. I identify two channels through
which union wage demands are impacted by globalization, the “elasticity effect”
and the “scale effect”. The elasticity effect measures the effect induced by a
change in the elasticity of labor demand facing the union, a la Rodrik. Other
things remaining the same, the higher the labor demand elasticity the union
faces, the lower is the mark-up it can charge over competitive wages. However
integration can also change the level of domestic investment desired by firms,
which in turn will shift labor demand. This is the scale effect which tends to pull
all wages in the economy up or down, depending on whether investment in the
country rises or falls. In this framework I show that whether closer integration
benefits or hurts workers depends on the extent to which capital is mobile, the size
of the union distortion and on the ability of the non-unionized sector to absorb
employment changes in the unionized sector without much effect on wages in that
sector.
Closer integration of factor markets is modeled as a reduction in the cost
of moving capital across borders. Under the assumed Cobb-Douglas production
structure, we show that increased capital mobility raises labor demand elasticity
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and tends to lower the union’s monopoly premium. However whether this decline
in premium translates into a decline in union wage depends on whether domestic
investment by firms rises or falls, and the volume of this change. For a country
where domestic rates of return on capital are higher than international rates,
enhanced capital mobility leads to greater investment by domestic firms and
pushes the competitive wage level up. This tends to push union wages up too. If
investment rises fast enough, the scale effect may dominate the elasticity effect so
that wages rise, and if markets are integrated enough, unemployment falls even
in the unionized sector. For a country where the opposite is true, the scale effect
reinforces the elasticity effect, and union wages must decline. However falling
union wages create more jobs in that sector, and moderate the impact of reduced
investment on the competitive wage level. I show that if the difference in the
domestic and international rate of return on capital is small and union distortion
large, the competitive wage may possibly even rise as more jobs are created by
union wage declines than are lost due to reduced investment. Thus we show that
though capital mobility reduces the bargaining power of the union, this does not
necessarily imply that such mobility is detrimental to worker interests.
The other aspect of integration is reduced product trade barriers. We assume
that the unionized sector produces the import competing good, and closer product
market integration is modeled as a reduction in that sector’s good price. Contrary
to Rodrik, I show that changing product prices have no direct impact on sectoral
labor demand elasticity, but affect it indirectly through their impact on domestic
investment. Elasticity may go up or down when product price falls, depending on
the extent to which capital is mobile. In general the impact on wages is subject
to the neo-classical ambiguity characteristic of the specific factors model, but I
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am able to show that workers face a larger burden from trade liberalization when
it is easier for capital to move to greener pastures abroad. Thus liberalization in
industries which are footloose is more costly for workers than in industries where
such mobility is difficult.
The third chapter of the thesis is an empirical exercise to determine how
integration affects union wage premiums. We examine how important threat
effects from outward foreign direct investment are in explaining differences in
union wage premiums across industries and over time. We also examine the
nature of union wage response to tariff protection, and whether this response
is affected by the size of the threat effect they face. We do this by combining
worker level data for the US obtained from the Current Population Surveys for
the years 1990-1996, with industry level data on openness and other industry
characteristics. Our study is different from previous literature in some important
respects. Firstly, in terms of how we define and estimate the industry union wage
premium. These are estimated as the wage differential that union members obtain
over similar non-members in the same industry. Secondly, we use the share of
industry capital invested in the US to the total worldwide industry capital stock,
as the measure of the threat unions face from outward foreign direct investment.
This is suggested by our theoretical model, and may arguably be a better measure
than looking at employment shares. Thirdly, we check for whether union response
to changes in trade policy measures (tariffs) differs systematically with the level
of the threat effect they face.
In line with theory, after controlling for industry and time fixed-effects, we
find evidence of a threat effect operating on unions. Unions were able to charge
higher premiums in industries that were mostly domestically invested, than in
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industries that had significant amount of capital invested abroad. To the extent
that the share of foreign direct investment to total investment is a reflection of
the opportunities for investing abroad, our findings confirm the prediction that
easier capital mobility increases labor demand elasticities. We also find evidence
that union response to tariff changes vary with the level of the threat effect.
Tariffs (lagged one year) were negatively related with union premiums for more
domestically invested industries, but positively related with them for industries
that were heavily invested abroad. This suggests that unions use protection to
raise employment in more domestically invested industries, and to raise premiums
in more globalized industries.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 builds up the ba-
sic theoretical model, and analyzes the impact of greater integration on factor
incomes in the economy. Chapter 3 presents the empirical exercise. Chapter 4
includes the appendices of chapter 2. Tables and figures are at the end.
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Chapter 2
Labor Market Effects of Integration in a
Unionized Economy
2.1 Introduction
In countries that move towards integrating markets by liberalizing trade and cap-
ital accounts, there is often a preoccupation with the effects of these policies on
wages and employment. The standard trade models address these issues in the
context of markets characterized by perfectly competitive labor markets and full
employment. These models ignore the effect of labor market institutions, which
often play an important role in wage determination. One such important insti-
tution are the labor unions. These continue to be important in many economies,
though unionization rates have been falling in many cases. In such economies
globalization can have impact workers on two fronts: Not only through shifting
labor demand between industries, but also by affecting the ability of unions to
set wages. If unions are large or if they are located in key wage setting sectors of
the economy, the wage and employment effects may be quite different than those
predicted by models which ignore this second effect.
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Theory suggests that unions might be very vulnerable to pressures generated
by the process of integration. These pressures are thought to come from two
fronts. On the one hand, trade liberalization implies greater competition for the
employer, possibly lower rents to be fought over, and greater pressure on unions
to reduce wages in order to maintain employment. Brander and Spencer (1988)
and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) model union-firm interaction in a Nash bar-
gaining framework. They show that tariff protection allows unions to collect part
of the increased firm level rents for its members in the form of higher wages.
The relationship between tariffs and union wages in their models is thus positive,
and liberalization reduces union wage. This sort of direct relationship need not
always hold though. Unions have the choice to respond to pressures either by
adjusting their wage and maintaining employment, or by just letting employment
fall. Grossman (1984) analyses how unions choose between the two from a po-
litical economy perspective. He constructs a model of a seniority-based union.
As import competition drives down domestic prices, a conflict of interests arises
between the marginal member who wants to lower wage demands to maintain his
chances of getting employment, and the more senior union members who wish
to raise wages (even at the cost of shrinking membership) since the probability
of their getting unemployed is small. He shows that whether unions adjust by
reducing wages or accepting a lower membership depends on the elasticity of
demand they face. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985), in a different context, show
that declining industries may be characterized by perverse union wage responses
to price declines, as the union tries to extract maximum rents at the cost of firm
profitability. Unions are able to raise wages since firm capacity is largely fixed in
the short run and capital is ”stuck”. Other research suggests that unions may
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be affected by product market integration even when this does not significantly
alter domestic prices. Reddy (2000a) shows that when firms compete monopolis-
tically, integration increases the number of competing firms in the industry, raises
the employment cost of raising wages, and leads unions to moderate their wage
demand. Rodrik (1998) argues that trade and capital mobility make domestic
labor more substitutable with foreign labor and raises the elasticity of the labor
demand curve facing unions. This reduces workers’ bargaining power over firm
rents and thus their bargained wage, even if the labor demand curve does not
shift.
The other potential vulnerability arises from the peculiar characteristic of the
current phase of integration which allows much more international mobility to
capital compared to labor. This is thought to have made capital “footloose,”
and shifted the balance of power within the firm in favor of capital. Mezetti and
Dinopoulous (1991) show that when firms have the option to relocate production
abroad, they can force local unions to accept lower wages. Zhao (1995) shows that
foreign direct investment by a firm increases its bargaining power vis-a-vis the
workers, since it can continue operating its foreign plant in case negotiations with
the domestic union fail. Rodrik (1999) argues that capital mobility, interpreted
as an improvement in capital’s outside options, strengthens capital’s position vis-
a-vis labor in wage bargaining. Similarly, Reddy (2000b) models capital mobility
in terms of cheaper relocation opportunities because of reduced transaction costs
of repatriating profits from abroad. He shows that even when no relocation or
price change takes place and production decisions are unchanged, a pure “threat
effect” may operate because of the international option allowed to capital which
leads to a decline in the negotiated workers’ share in rents.
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While these models are instructive in identifying potential channels union vul-
nerabilities to integration, the effects on wages and employment need to be stud-
ied in a general equilibrium model. This approach is warranted on two grounds.
Firstly, because this allows us to capture the effects of the integration process on
labor demand in different sectors of the economy, and thus on the union’s outside
wage option. Ignoring these effects can bias our conclusions. Secondly they allow
us to take account of the fact that unions distort labor markets, and that workers
may potentially benefit from a reduction in this distortion. This chapter sets
up a specific factors model of a two-sector economy where one of the sectors is
unionized. The union is able to set sectoral wages because of its position as a
monopoly supplier of labor. This sector also utilizes capital as one of the factors
of production, and this factor of production is internationally mobile. Unlike pre-
vious work, I model capital mobility explicitly in terms of mobility costs, which
restrict the extent to which capital (in the sense of direct foreign investment) can
move across borders in response to the difference between its returns at home and
abroad. The advantage of this definition is that I am also able to account for the
effects induced by the movement of capital in or out of the domestic economy,
since this is bound to affect the general wage when the unionized sector is large.
The model economy is usually characterized by both inter-industry wage differen-
tials, and unemployment.1 Workers choose between joining the union and being
eligible for a higher paying union job though with no certainty of getting this, or
joining the lower paying non-unionized sector but with certainty of employment.
1The existense of such interindustry wage differentials has been extensively documented
by Katz and Summers (1989) who contend that ”these wage differentials largely reflect rents
earned by workers in high-wage industries”.
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Both union wages and membership are endogenously determined.
In this set-up, I examine Rodrik’s (1998) proposition that globalization (un-
derstood as reduced barriers to trade or enhanced capital mobility) increases the
elasticity of the labor demand curve facing workers. I interpret “labor demand”
to be the sectoral labor demand, and not national labor demand as defined by
Leamer (1995) and Panagariya (1999). I examine how increased integration of
a country’s product and capital markets into the world economy affects unions
and wages. I identify two channels through which wages are impacted by glob-
alization, the elasticity effect and the scale effect. The elasticity effect measures
the ability of the union to distort labor markets, and depends on the elasticity
of labor demand facing it. Under the assumed Cobb-Douglas production struc-
ture, I show that increased mobility raises labor demand elasticity,2 and thus
the employment cost to the union of distorting wages in its favor. The scale
effect measures the spillover effects, in terms of how employment changes in the
unionized sector impact outside wages, and hence the union’s wage demand.
I show that contrary to the existing claims in the literature, increased capital
mobility need not lower wages either in the unionized sector, or economy wide.
Greater capital mobility does increase the elasticity of labor demand and hurt
unions. However it also increases the volume of capital flows. The scale effect
reinforces the elasticity effect when capital flows out of the country, but coun-
teracts it when capital flows in. For a capital importing country, we show that
enhanced capital mobility increases the general wage level, and may also increase
2However depending on the production function the effect of falling mobility costs on labor
demand elasticity may be outweighed by the effects of changing capital intensity along the labor
demand curve. Holding wage constant, the elasticity of the shifted sectoral labor demand curve
may thus be higher or lower depending on the form the production function takes.
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wages in the unionized sector and union membership, thus benefiting labor in
general. For a capital exporting country, greater mobility leads to a decline in
union wages. However, this decline moderates the fall in the general wage level.
I show that when capital outflows are small, all workers may even benefit from
increased mobility. The paper captures the effects of increased international com-
petition in terms of a reduction in the unionized sector’s product price. I show
that changing product prices have no direct impact on sectoral labor demand
elasticity, but affect it indirectly through their impact on domestic capital usage.
Elasticity may go up or down when product price falls, depending on the extent
to which capital is mobile. The effects of liberalization are shown to be different
depending on the degree of integration with the world capital market. When the
economy is not well integrated, union wages fall along with product price, but at
a lesser pace. Union members also benefit from increased employment probabil-
ity. However when capital can move abroad relatively freely, union wages may
fall even faster. The effect of liberalization on wages thus depends crucially on
the existing degree of capital mobility.
The following section builds up the basic model, and explains the equilibrium
in this integrated economy. Section 2.3 examines the impact of enhanced capital
mobility on the economy. Section 2.4 examines how country-specific price changes
affect agents in the economy and the impact on factor incomes. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 A model of a unionized economy
The economy consists of two sectors producing goods 1 and 2. Both goods are
produced by a large number of identical firms producing an undifferentiated prod-
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uct with a constant returns to scale technology. For notational ease, the number
of firms producing good 1 is normalized to one. While labor is assumed to be
mobile between sectors, each sector also utilizes one specific factor in production.
Production in sector 2 requires labor (L2) and a specific factor, land (T). Land is
immobile between sectors, and also internationally. Its total supply in the econ-
omy is assumed to be fixed at T . In sector 1 production requires capital (K) and
labor (L). The production functions in the two sectors can be denoted as:
Q1 = K
αL1−α ; Q2 = G(L2, T );
A Cobb-Douglas production function is chosen in the case of sector 1 because
the tractability it provides because (holding capital fixed) the elasticity of the
marginal product of labor (= LFLL(.)/FL(.) = −α1) is constant. This condition
allows attention to be focussed on the effect that capital mobility alone has on
labor demand elasticity in this sector.
The home country is assumed to be a small, open economy. Both goods are
internationally traded and we assume that international prices are such that the
economy remains diversified. Goods prices are determined in the world market,
and are taken as exogenous by both producers and consumers in the economy.3
Good 2 is the numeraire good, whose price is normalized to one. The relative
price of good 1 is p. Thus the basic set-up corresponds to the standard two good,
three factor model as analyzed by Jones (1971). We depart from the traditional
3This assumption makes the model more tractable by preventing domestic output changes
from affecting domestic goods prices. Consequently union wage demands do not affect prices in
the economy. This confers two advantages. Firstly, union does not have to worry about price
effects while setting wages . Secondly, we can also abstract from demand changes caused by
changes in goods prices induced by union wages.
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model in two respects.
(i) Capital Mobility : Firstly in terms of assuming that the specific factor
in sector 1, capital, is mobile internationally. We assume that a well developed
international market exists for this factor where domestic firms, being small, can
borrow or lend any amount of capital they own at the international rental rate
(r*). To keep the model simple, we also assume that the home country is small
in world capital markets and that the world rental rate remains unaffected by the
firms decisions.4 A firm will want to buy units of capital and increase domestic
investment if the domestic rate of return on capital exceeds the international
rental rate. If the opposite is true, then the firm will sell domestic capital in
world capital markets by lowering domestic investment. The crucial assumption
is that international capital mobility is not costless for firms. Larger amounts of
capital can be moved only at higher costs. In particular, the typical firm i faces
quadratic costs while buying or selling capital, which are of the form 5:
C = λ(Ki −K0i)2/2
These costs might arise from a variety of reasons. They may reflect the costs
of (i) marketing overseas, (ii) negotiating a foreign deal, (iii) transportation and
installation (iv) tariffs and other non-tariff barriers, or (v) adapting capital to
4This assumption is not crucial to the model, and can easily be relaxed. Analytically, this
would mean that the domestic supply curve of capital is upward sloping. The consequence of
cheaper capital mobility would still be to rotate the domestic capital supply curve closer to the
international supply curve.
5This formulation of costs yields similar first order conditions for the firms optimization as
those derived in Rodrik (1998). Rodrik, however, does not explicitly model firm level mobility
costs, but assumes that the countries capital supply curve is upward rising because of the
presense of capital mobility costs.
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foreign standards and conditions. Eaton and Kotum (2001) find cost barriers
in capital equipment trade to be quantitatively important. Some of these com-
ponents may be expected to be linear, but a large part representing the cost
of marketing and transacting abroad, or the cost of adjusting to large changes
in the capital stock and adapting capital to local conditions can be expected
to be larger dependent on the size of the transaction. The assumption of con-
vex mobility costs implies that the marginal mobility costs rise with the volume
of transaction. The significance of these costs is captured by the parameter λ.
The exact value that this parameter takes depends partially on the state of world
capital markets, and partially on government policies aimed at controlling capital
flows. These mobility costs introduce an element of rigidity in domestic capital
usage. The higher these costs are, the harder it is to alter domestic investment,
and consequently the smaller are the linkages between domestic and world capital
markets. λ can thus also be taken as a measure of the extent of capital mobility.
The case of λ being infinitely high approximates a situation of no capital mobility.
As it becomes prohibitively expensive to move capital, capital employment must
equal domestic capital endowment. The rate of return on capital then becomes
delinked with the international rate, and is determined domestically. If λ is close
to zero, capital is costlessly mobile. Domestic capital owners then face competi-
tion from world capital markets, and being small, cannot obtain a rate of return
higher than the international rental rate.
(ii) Monopoly Labor Union : The second point of departure is through the
assumption that sector 1 is unionized. Each firm operating here is supplied labor
through a monopoly union that utilizes its position to set wages higher than their
competitive level.. Though the union specifies the wage rate that must be paid to
18
workers in this sector, it cannot dictate the number of workers the firm wants to
employ at that wage. The union thus operates under a “right to manage” system.
This process is inefficient, as pointed out by McDonald and Solow (1981) and Hall
and Lillen (1979) because the monopoly union could do better by negotiating over
both wages and employment. However it may be argued that in most cases, union
contracts take the form assumed here.6 We assume that the union acts as a Nash
player, and does not internalize the impact its wage demands will have on the
wage in the other sector, w2.
The representative union’s objectives are described by the following function:
U = (w − w2)Lγ
The belief that the union values both the wage gap and total employment
are conventional in the theory of trade unions’ behavior (see for e.g., Farber).
Additional flexibility is derived by the use of the parameter γ, where γ measures
the relative importance the union places of employment vis-a-vis the wage gap.
In theory this can take any strictly positive value. When it is equal to one,
the function describes the case of the “rent maximizing” union. However in
the model, to ensure stability we assume that γ > max(α, (1 − α)). The union
maximizes its objective function subject to the labor demand curve facing it.
6Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) state that “employment is almost never bargained as
such” in most union contracts. In the US, contracts also include a “management rights” clause
which gives companies the right to make adjustments to their labor force. Striking to prevent
layoffs is also not legally acceptable. Similarly Farber notes that “the more common situation
(for a union) is either of no control over employment, or the negotiation of work rules that
attempt to control the capital-labor or labor-output ratio.”
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This leads to a wage demand w such that:
w(1− 1/γ ) = w2 (2.1)
where denotes the total elasticity of labor demand facing the union, and is
defined to be positive. This is similar to the optimization condition for a mo-
nopolist, modified to take account of the additional weight the union places on
employment. The union is thus able to generate an inter-industry wage differen-
tial because of its monopoly power.
We assume that there are L number of identical workers in the economy, each
ex-ante endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically in the
market. Workers are assumed to be perfectly immobile across national borders.
Each worker is assumed to hold only one job, and there is no job-sharing. The
number of workers employed in any sector is thus equal to the labor demanded
in that sector. Workers have a choice at the beginning of each stage regarding
which sector they seek employment in. All workers seeking employment in the
unionized sector need to become members of the monopoly union.7 The choice of
deciding which sector to seek employment in is therefore equivalent to deciding
whether or not to join the union.
Joining the union makes workers eligible for a higher paying union job. At the
same time, however, firms in this sector are under no compulsion to employ all
union members. In fact, since union wages are always at least as much as w2 there
7Though the assumption of compulsory union membership is strong, some justification may
be obtained by assuming that union dues are negligable (Blanchflower and Bryson (2002)).
From the workers point of view therefore, joining the union is costless, but doing so increases
unions bargaining power, and so potentially benefits them. There is then little incentive for
them to stay out of the union. The union too has no incentive to restrict membership.
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will always be a queue of workers waiting to enter this sector and L ≤M (where
M represents union membership). Consequently some union workers find them-
selves unemployed. Thus unionization generates (temporary) unemployment in
the model. This unemployment is involuntary from the workers point of view,
though the risk of this happening is fully anticipated. The typical union member
thus has to weigh the benefit of higher wages against the possibility of unem-
ployment. The probability of employment in sector 1 is represented by π, where
π = L/M.
The portion of union members unable to gain employment in sector 1 are
forced to seek employment in sector 2. However ex-post mobility is costly. Union
workers who have to shift sectors in stage two face a loss of (1 − β) portion of
their labor endowment, where β ∈ [0, 1]. β may represent time spent looking for
an alternate job offer, or some portion of labor endowment lost in the process of
changing sectors. The labor supply to sector 2 is all the residual labor left over
from sector 1. Thus L2 = L−M + β(M − L) or






Wages in sector 2 are competitively set to absorb all workers seeking employ-
ment in that sector. Suppressing β, thus w2 = w2(L, π). We measure the re-
sponsiveness of sector 2 wage to employment in the unionized sector as η, where
η = (∂w2/∂L)/(w2/L) is the elasticity of the w2 to employment in the unionized
sector. In this analysis, we assume that η < 1.
The size of the interindustry differential endogenously determines union mem-
bership, and unemployment probability π. Assuming risk neutrality, a worker is
indifferent between the two sectors when his expected wage from either decision
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is equal. To keep the analysis simple we assume that seniority is not an issue
in wage negotiations, or in determining layoffs. All union members receive the
same wages and face the same probability of being laid off. We also rule out
the possibility of internal transfers within the union, like union-administered un-
employment schemes. Since all workers and unions are identical, the condition
determining union membership can be represented at the sectoral level as:
πw + (1− π)βw2 = w2 (2.2)
Note that even though the ex-ante supply of labor in the economy is fixed,
because of unemployment, the ex-post labor supply in the economy is variable.
The larger the wage gap generated by the union, the larger is the portion of
labor endowment which is wasted. This captures the distortionary effect the
unionization has on labor markets.
The final link in the chain is to figure the labor demand by firms in each
sector. We assume that all firms are small, and act as price takers in both the
goods and input markets. Since all firms are identical, the market clearing wages
in sector 2 and the return to Land are represented by the first order conditions:
w2 = GL(L2, T ) (2.3)
rT = [G(L2, T )−GL(L2, T )L2]/T
The assumption of a fixed supply of the specific factor in sector 2 means
that labor faces diminishing returns in that sector. Since this sectoral wage rate
represents the opportunity wage of labor, outside wages are declining in L2. This
means that η is positive.
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In sector 1 capital owners are also the owners of firms. The economy starts off
being endowed with K0 amount of capital, all of which is divided equally among
the identical domestic firms. The actual domestic investment of the typical ith
firm, Ki, can however differ from its endowment, K0i. Any additional (extra)
capital must be bought (sold) from abroad. During the stage, firms observe
union wage demand (w), international rental rates (r∗), marginal mobility cost
(λ) and product price (p). The profit maximizing problem of the typical firm ‘i’
in sector 1 can be represented as follows:
max
Li,Ki
pF (Li,Ki)− wiLi − r∗(Ki −K0i)− λ(Ki −K0i)2/2
Since all firms are identical and their number is normalized to one, the first
order conditions can be represented in terms of industry wide capital and labor
employment as follows:
pFL(L,K) = w (2.4)
pFK(L,K) = r ∗+λ(K −K0) (2.5)
Where L =
P
i Li is the industry level employment in sector Y, and K =
P
iKi
is the industry employment of capital. Applying Euler’s condition the profits
that firms make can be estimated as:
R = r ∗K0 − λ/2 ∗ (K2 −K20) (2.6)
Suppressing r* and K0, which are assumed exogenous in the model, K =
K(w, p, λ), and L = L(w, p, λ). From condition 2.5, note that in a firm which
buys foreign capital, domestic units of capital earn rental rates higher than their
opportunity cost (r∗) and earn positive rents. On the other hand, if the firm sells
capital abroad, the effective return on the marginal capital unit, after accounting
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for mobility costs, is lower than the international rental rate. Domestic units of
capital are “stuck” at home, and earn lower rental rates than r∗. Thus in the
presence of capital mobility costs, domestic firms face an upward sloping supply
curve for capital, even when the international supply curve is horizontal. The
slope of this supply curve depends on the value that λ takes. Lower mobility
costs collapse the domestic capital supply curve towards the world capital supply
curve. Consequently domestic rental rates become less responsive to the efficient
capital stock, and become more closely fixed to the international rental rate. The
responsiveness of domestic rate of return to changes in domestic investment are







θ is the inverse of the elasticity of the domestic capital supply curve . It can
range from 0 (when λ is zero), to being infinity high (when λ is close to infinity)
when capital is immobile. This means that θ = θ(λ,K(w, p, λ)).
Lemma 1 When capital is mobile, higher union wages lower domestic invest-
ment by firms. The responsiveness of capital to wages is higher (i) The higher
the share of labor in total costs and, (ii) The more elastic the domestic capital
supply curve.
Totally differentiating equations 2.4 and 2.5, and solving yields the following
(where the hats denote rates of change):bKbw = −(1− ααθ ) (2.7)
This means that union wages and domestic investment move in opposite
directions. As the union increases its wage (product prices being fixed) domes-
tic rates of return on capital are compressed. The higher the share of labor
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in total costs (or the smaller α is), the larger this compression is and con-
sequently, the greater the incentive for capital to escape abroad. Note that
∂(− bK/bw)/∂α = −1/α2θ ≤ 0.
The amount of capital that can escape, however, depends on how high mobility
costs are. At one extreme if these are infinitely high, no capital can leave the
domestic economy. At the other extreme, when mobility costs tend to zero, the
supply of capital becomes perfectly elastic at the prevailing international rate
and domestic rental rates cannot be compressed beyond this. Remembering that
θ measures the inverse of the elasticity of the domestic capital supply curve, this
is captured by the observation that ∂(− bK/bw)/∂θ = −(1− α)/αθ2 ≤ 0.
Lemma 2 The elasticity of demand for labor in the unionized sector is dependent
on the degree of mobility of the factor specific to that sector.
Raising wages in the unionized sector reduces employment there on two counts.
Firstly it promotes a substitution of labor by capital, holding domestic rental
rates fixed. Given our assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function, this
effect is constant and depends on the share of labor in total costs. However as
rental rates fall, capital investment also declines and the labor demand curve
shifts inwards, reducing employment further. The total change in labor demand
due to a change in union wage in the sum of this substitution and scale effects.
The decline in firms’ investment depends on θ, and thus on capital mobility costs.
Totally differentiating equations 2.4 and 2.5, and solving yields the following:
= −
bLbw = 1α + (1− α)αθ (2.8)
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Thus = (θ) = (λ,K(w, p, λ)). Another way to look at this is by realizing
that cheaper mobility makes labor more easily substitutable by capital since it
becomes easier for firms to change their capital investment levels. This increases
the elasticity of substitution between the two factors, and through this the elas-
ticity of demand for labor. The relationship between the two has been formalized
by Hicks (1963) and Hamermesh (1993).
2.2.1 Equilibrium
The model operates over two stages. In the first stage, agents observe product
prices and marginal capital mobility costs. The union in sector 1 then announces
its wage demand. This wage cannot then be renegotiated. Simultaneously work-
ers decide which sector to seek employment in. Subsequently in the second stage,
firms in sector 1 take their production and employment decisions. Any unem-
ployed labor from sector 1 migrates to sector 2. The latter sector absorbs the
surplus labor and wages there are competitively determined. All factor payments
are made at the end of the second stage. Both the union and the workers know the
firms’ production function, there is no uncertainty, and there are no asymmetric
information problems. The discount rate is normalized to zero.
Equilibrium in the model implies solving conditions 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.1
and 2.2 which define the whole system. Equilibrium means determining labor
allocation between the two sectors, and hence a set of union and non-union wages,
such that both the union’s maximizing condition and the workers’ membership
conditions are satisfied.
Union wage demand schedule: The union’s wage demand condition relates
union mark-up with the elasticity of labor demand. However both outside wages
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and labor demand elasticity are endogenously determined, and ultimately depend
on union wage and unemployment probability. The union’s optimizing condition
2.1 implies that w = w(π, p, λ). Holding product prices and mobility costs fixed,
this condition implies a Union Wage Demand Schedule (VV) relating different
levels of π with the wage demand they would evoke from the union. Totally
differentiating this condition, and using 2.7 and 2.8 yields:
dw/dπ = − (1− β)η





Holding union wage fixed, an increase in π means that less labor is destroyed
because of unemployment. An increase in labor supply tends to push wages in
sector 2 down. For the union to be in equilibrium again, its own wage demand
must also fall. How much it falls depends on how responsive w2 is to changes
in employment, and the markup unions can charge which depends on its own
sectoral labor demand elasticity. This is measured by the term η. However as
union wages fall, a secondary effect also arises because some investment in the
economy rises, and this pushes firms to a less elastic portion of their (shifted)
labor demand curve. This is reflected in the remaining terms in the denominator
in the above expression. Thus ceterus paribus, the union becomes less aggressive
in its wage demand, the less unemployment there is in its own sector.8
Workers membership schedule: The membership constraint relates union
wage gap with the probability of unemployment in the unionized sector. This
8Note that the slope of the schedule depends on how responsive w2 is to changes in its labor
supply. A special case in this model would be where the non-unionized sector can absorb any
amount of labor at constant wages (ηL =0). This breaks down the relationship between π and
outside wages, and thus union wage. In this case the wage demand schedule becomes horizontal.
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condition yields a membership schedule showing different combinations of union
wages and unemployment probability in sector 1 which satisfy the typical worker’s
membership constraint. The relationship between w and M implied by this mem-
bership constraint (MM) is:
dw/dπ = − (1− β)(1 + η)
(1− β + βπ) (1 + η) ≤ 0 (2.10)
The relationship between w and π implied by the membership constraint is
negative. As wages rise in the unionized sector, employment falls even as joining
the union becomes more attractive. This means that the probability of getting
employment in sector 1 must fall for all union members.
The equilibrium union sector wage, employment and wages in the outside
sector are determined where the wage demand schedule and the membership
schedule intersect with each other. (Figure 1).
2.3 Effects of enhanced Capital Mobility
An important feature of the current phase of globalization has been closer in-
tegration of domestic capital markets with world markets. This has been aided
by declines in transportation costs, improvements in communication technolo-
gies and political decisions by governments to attract new investments. These
include the opening of industries previously closed to FDI, the streamlining or
abolition of approval procedures and the provision of incentives. Bilateral invest-
ment treaties aiming at the promotion and protection of such investment have
also been concluded between many countries (Epstein, 2000). These develop-
ments have increased the ability of firms to shift production internationally. The
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model captures these increases in capital mobility as a decline in the firm’s costs
of moving capital, or a fall in the value of the parameter λ.
The direct effects of this change can be estimated by differentiating equations
2.4 and 2.5 and solving. This shows that holding union wages constant, cheaper
mobility prompts larger transactions in capital by firms in sector 1. This changes
the domestic investment level of firms and thus shifts the labor demand curve,
either to the left if firms are net sellers of capital in international markets or to
the right if they are net purchasers.
bK = −(1− α
αθ
)bw − (K −K0)
K
bλ (2.11)
At the same time, as noted earlier the elasticity of labor demand in sector 1
depends on mobility costs, and will be affected by changes in it.
Proposition 1 Cheaper capital mobility makes the original sectoral labor de-
mand curve more elastic at every point. When investment is allowed to change
also, labor demand elasticity is higher at the same wage along the shifted labor
demand curve.
The proof of the proposition is presented in the appendix 1 of the thesis.A
graphical representation is provided in figure 2. The intuition for this result is
that as the union raises wages, firms respond by either selling more capital in
international markets or lowering their intended purchases. Firms can substitute
labor by capital more easily, the more easily they can adjust their domestic capital
stock without requiring large changes in the rate of return on it. The cheaper
capital mobility is, the less steeply upward sloping is the domestic capital supply
curve, and the more substitutable labor therefore is with capital. This supports
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Rodrik’s assertion that capital mobility increases labor demand elasticities9 The
strength of the elasticity effect is directly related to the proportion of domestic
capital endowment to total investment. Thus the same percentage fall in the
marginal mobility cost will cause a larger percentage change in the elasticity in
capital exporting countries, than in capital importing ones.
Effect on the union’s wage demand schedule: The union is impacted
by an increase in the degree of capital mobility in two ways: firstly because this
changes the domestic investment level of domestic firms and thus labor demand.
Secondly, because the shifted demand curve that it now faces is more elastic. This
reduces its ability to charge a mark-up over wages in sector 2. The total impact
on the union wage demand schedule (VV) can be gauged by totally differentiating
equation 2.1. This is done in the appendix. To examine how the wage demand

















The sign of the expression above depends on the sign of the numerator since
under model assumptions the denominator is always positive. The first term
in the numerator measures the elasticity effect induced by better capital mobil-
ity, i.e., the effect of increased labor demand elasticity on union wage demand.
Ceterus paribus, this tends to make the union tone down its wage demand. In-
dustries where most of the capital is domestic are those where the elasticity effect
9Note however that our choice of a Cobb-Douglas plays an important role in generating
this strong effect on elasticity. Other production functions can yield different results, because
changes in the capital intensity of production may mask the effects of increasing capital mobility
on labor demand elasticity.
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is felt most strongly. On the other hand the effect is weaker the higher the weight
the union places on employment, because then the union induced distortion is
small to start off with. The initial degree of integration of the economy with
world markets, as measured by θ, has a non-linear impact on the strength of
the elasticity effect. The effect is insignificant when capital is completely immo-
bile, and again as the economy approaches full capital mobility (θ → 0). The
strongest disciplining effects on unions are felt when the economy is relatively,
but not completely closed to international capital markets.
The second termmeasures the spillover “scale effect” resulting from changes in
domestic investment by firms, induced by cheaper access to international capital
markets. This affects employment in the unionized sector, thus the outside wage
and the union wage. The direction in which the scale effect pulls wages depends on
whether investment rises or falls. Its strength however depends on how significant
international capital transactions are at prevailing international prices, and on
the responsiveness of outside wages to changing employment in the unionized
sector. The scale effect is small if unionized sector employment changes have no
significant impact on outside wages (η is close to 0), or when domestic rates of
return on capital are close to international rates.
If the unionized sector is a seller of capital, both the scale and elasticity effects
resulting from greater capital mobility work in the same direction, to pull union
wages down (holding π fixed) the net result is that wages in the unionized sector
must decline along with mobility costs. Thus the VV schedule shifts down as λ
falls. For a country which purchases capital from abroad, however, though the
elasticity effect hurts the union’s monopoly power, expanding employment in the
unionized sector raises the base outside wage. The wage in the unionized sector
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may rise or fall depending on whether the rise in w2 is enough to overcome the
fall in the union mark-up or not.
Effect on workers membership constraint: A change in the degree of
capital mobility also impacts workers’ perceptions of the probability of unemploy-
ment, and consequently shifts the membership schedule. Totally differentiating





−η(1− β + βπ)(K−K0
K
)
(1− β)(1 + η) (2.12)
It can be seen that the membership schedule shifts right or left as λ declines,
depending on whether a country was buying or selling capital from world markets
at the original equilibrium. For a seller of capital declining domestic investment
reduces employment in the unionized sector. The earlier union wage is now
sustainable only if employment probability rises enough to restore the equality
in expected wages. Thus the membership schedule shifts to the left. The exact
opposite holds when the country is a net capital buyer. The more the sector
interacts with world capital markets, the larger is the impact on capital flows
and greater the shift in the membership schedule.
Since a decline in marginal mobility costs affects the decisions of both the
union and workers, it will have an impact on wages in both sectors and on the
distribution of labor between them. Adjustment in the unionized sector can
proceed along two fronts. Either the union can choose to adjust wages and accept
higher unemployment probabilities for its members, or lower wages in order to
keep more of its members employed.
Proposition 2 In a country which sells capital in international markets, greater
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capital mobility forces the union to reduce its wage demand. The effect on mem-
bers’ probability of employment depends on how integrated the country is with the
world capital market. In a country where firms buy capital from abroad, union
wage may rise if i) the country transacts a lot in international markets, ii) out-
side wage is very responsive to employment changes in the unionized sector, or
(iii) if the union is very employment oriented. If union wages rise, the effect on
members employment probability is unclear. However if wages fall, employment
probability must increase.
A graphical representation of this proposition is presented in figures 2 and 3.


















Under the assumptions of the model, the denominator is always positive.
Thus the sign of the above expression depends on the sign of the numerator.
An economic meaning can be assigned to this expression as follows: The first
term measures the change in the mark-up that unions can obtain over wages
in sector 2, and is related to the labor demand elasticity they face. As noted
earlier, greater capital mobility increases this elasticity and this elasticity effects
always tends to make the union tone down its wage demand. The second term in
the numerator measures the increase in w2 resulting from the fact that increased
investment in the unionized sector increases labor demand there at the prevailing
union wage. A secondary effect on w2 arises because a fall in union-non-union
wage gap reduces unemployment in sector 1, and increases labor supply. Union
wages rise only if the base wage rises faster than the decline in the mark-up.
If outside wages are unaffected by changes in the unionized sector, our general
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equilibrium model collapses effectively into a partial equilibrium model. This
model implies neglecting scale effects so that capital mobility affects the union
only negatively through the elasticity effect. The inevitable result is that union
wages must decline. However when scale effects are also considered, the picture
may be different depending on which direction the scale effects work in. In an
economy where the unionized sector is losing capital, sectoral wages are pulled
down by the combined effects of a declining union-maintained wage gap, and
falling outside wages induced by larger capital outflows (Figure 3). For a capital
importing country however, the situation is different. Though the position of the
union here too is undercut by the increased labor demand elasticity, union wages
receive some support because the inflow of capital raises employment and pulls
the outside wage up. The final result depends on which one of the two effects
dominates (Figure 4). Economies where capital imports were large, where unions
were very employment oriented, or where mobility was high, are those where
wages may rise in response to greater capital mobility.
Solving for π we get the following condition,
bπbλ = −



























The change in employment probability depends on the elasticity effects, the
scale effects and the effect of changing labor supply in the economy all mixed to-
gether. For a country where the unionized sector attracts capital, the numerator
is positive. For a country which is losing capital, a sufficient condition to ensure
that employment probability rises when λ falls is that θ < 1. For such economies,
initially the union is able to use its monopoly power to prevent its wages from
adjusting proportionately, and employment probability may therefore even rise.
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However as the economy becomes integrated with the world capital market and θ
falls, the distortion reducing effect of capital mobility outweighs the scale effects.
Union wages adjust more than proportionately, and employment probability in-
creases. When domestic firms buy capital from abroad to invest domestically,
however, θ > 1 ensures that elasticity effects dominate over scale effects so that
the union adjusts wages more than proportionately and employment probability
rises.
Proposition 3 When the unionized sector buys capital from abroad, greater cap-
ital mobility raises wages in the non-unionized sector. Even in an economy which
sells capital to world markets, workers may gain from integration when capital
outflows are small enough.
Differentiating 2.3 gives us that cw2 = η ³bL− (1−β+βπ)(1−β) bπ´ . Solving for this






























For a capital importing economy, cheaper access to world capital markets
boosts domestic investment and labor demand, and has a positive impact on labor
incomes in general. An additional bonus is that it reduces union monopoly power,
and promotes greater investment at home. For both of these reasons, workers in
sector 2 gain from capital mobility. In an economy which loses capital, however,
larger capital outflows reduce employment in the unionized sector and tend to
pull all wages down. This effect is however countered by the collapse of union
wages, which generates new employment in the unionized sector. If the difference
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between domestic and international rates of return on capital is small, or if the
union distortion was very large to start off with, it is possible that outside wages
may even rise. However when capital outflows are significant, it is unlikely that
labor would benefit from increasing capital mobility.
Any increase in the outside wage rate will compress returns to the other
specific factor, land. The domestic owners of this factor therefore are hurt by
enhanced capital mobility when the economy is a net importer of capital. They
may benefit though, when the country exports a substantial amount of capital to
foreign markets, and employment declines force wage in sector 2 down.
Another interesting aspect is to examine the impact of mobility on union
generated inter-industry wage differentials. Using our results it can be shown
that : bw −cw2bλ = (1 + η)
K0
K
− ( − 1/α)(1− θ)η(K−K0
K
)³







The first term in the numerator measures the elasticity effect which always
acts to reduce the differential as capital becomes more mobile. The second term
measures the effect of investment changes. Their direction depends on the degree
of integration with world capital markets, and the direction of its transactions
with the home economy. If we were to abstract away from scale effects by as-
suming that η is zero, note that interindustry wage differentials always fall when
factor markets become more integrated. The speed with which they fall depends
on the ratio of domestic endowment to investment.
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2.4 Price Changes in an Integrated Economy
The other major component of globalization has been through product market
integration. Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have been falling in the case
of most countries, and the volume of trade has grown at a very rapid pace. We
assume that the union is located in the import competing sector and its domestic
price incorporates some trade distortion, such as an import tariff. Liberalization
involves the removal of this distortion, the effect of which is felt through a lower
product price for sector 1. Since the economy is assumed small in international
markets, international product and factor prices remain unaffected by this policy
change.
As before we differentiate sector 1 firms’ profit maximizing first order con-
ditions. This shows that if the union were to keep its wage fixed, a reduction
in price would induce domestic firms to lower their investment by selling some
capital abroad. The amount of capital that is sold abroad depends on how large
the price change was, and also on how easily capital investment can change in
response to a change in its domestic rate of return (as captured by the term 1/θ).





where ω refers to the real wage in the unionized sector (ω = w/p). For this
entire section, real wage refers to wage measured in terms of product 1’s prices,
and price refers to the unionized sector product price, p.
However union wages cannot remain unaffected by this change for two reasons.
Firstly, because as investment in sector 1 goes down, so does employment. This
drives more workers to sector 2, and wages there fall in response. This decline
tends to drag union wages down too. As before, this is the scale effect of the price
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change. However union mark-ups depend on labor demand elasticities, which in
our general equilibrium framework, are endogenous.
Proposition 4 In the unionized sector, a price change causes an inward shift of
the sectoral labor demand curve when capital is mobile. At the same real union
wage, labor demand elasticity is lower at a lower price along this shifted demand
curve when θ > 1, and higher when θ < 1.





= −(1− α)(1− θ)
(1− α+ θ)θ which is ≶ 0 as θ ≶ 1
From lemma 2 we know that = (λ,K(w, p, λ)). Thus prices do not directly
affect the responsiveness of labor demand to real wages, but affect it indirectly
through their effect on firms’ efficient capital stock. Note that since the in-
ternational rental rate for capital is constant, a domestic price decline makes
international markets more attractive for home country firms10. Thus even when
the union keeps its real wages fixed, domestic firms would like to reduce domestic
investment by selling capital abroad. How much capital they can sell abroad
depends on how fast mobility costs increase. When it is relatively costly to move
capital across the border (θ > 1), not much capital can escape. It is now difficult
for firms to substitute labor by more capital, and thus the new labor demand
curve is less elastic. However when the economy is better integrated with world
capital markets, and θ is below unity, domestic rate of return on capital are
more closely linked to the international rental rate. Adjustment in such mar-
kets occurs mostly through capital movements. When price falls, the equilibrium
10This is true if capital owners spend their incomes domestically.
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capital-labor ratio declines too. Firms find it easier to substitute labor with cap-
ital at the new equilibrium, and labor demand elasticity thus goes up. Thus
in contrast to Rodrik we show that there is no direct correlation between trade
openness and labor demand elasticity. This result may partially explain why the
empirical findings that the linkage between greater trade openness and elastic-
ity is weak (Slaughter, 1997; Krishna et. al., 2001; Fajnzylber and Maloney,
2000). Note that as the economy becomes more integrated with the world capital
market, the elasticity effect becomes smaller.
UnionWage Demand Schedule: Liberalization impacts the union because
of both, its effect on employment in the unionized sector, and on the elasticity of
demand it faces. Totally differentiating equation 2.1 expressed in terms of real
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The sign of the expression above depends on the sign of the numerator. As
before, the first term there measures the elasticity effect. Its direction depends
on how demand elasticity changes when price falls, which in turn depends on
the value θ takes. The elasticity effect is negative when the economy is not
well integrated in world capital markets, and positive when it is. The last two
terms measure the scale effect that occurs because of the effect on wages in the
second sector. How fast real wages fall in sector 2 depends on the amount of
labor released by the unionized sector (1/θ), and the responsiveness of outside
wages to this (1/η). Note that when θ > 1, this term is negative and thus the
wage demand schedule shifts up. This means that at the prevailing membership
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level, the union will adjust its wage demand less than proportionately to the price
change. However if θ < 1, the direction of the shift is a priori indeterminate and
depends on that value η takes.
Workers’ Membership Schedule: A change in prices will also impact
workers’ perceptions of the probability of unemployment, and the penalty if they
are unemployed. This is reflected in a shift in the workers membership sched-
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Holding union real wages constant, a decline in price compresses employment
in the unionized sector, increases labor supply to sector 2 and reduces wages
there. If η < θ employment in sector 1 declines faster than outside wages fall.
This makes the competitive sector more attractive, and the result is that at the
prevailing union real wage, workers will want to join the union only if they are
compensated for this by an increase in employment probability. This happens
because union membership declines even faster than employment. A graphical
representation is presented in figure 4.
Proposition 5 Wage falls in the unionized sector when its product price declines.
However the percentage decline in union wages is less than the percentage decline
in prices when θ > 1. Union members also gain from a decrease in unemployment
probability. When θ < 1, the same holds only when wage in the other sector is
unresponsive enough.
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Solving the equations showing the effects on the wage demand and member-

















The sign of the above depends on the sign of the numerator. Clearly this is
negative when θ > 1. In this case the union is able to prevent its wages falling
as fast as its product price because of two reasons. Firstly because liberalization
leads to smaller investment declines, since capital cannot move abroad as easily.
Secondly because as employment falls, labor demand elasticity rises and this
allows unions to raise their mark-up. The result is that union real wages rise
in terms of its product price, but fall in terms of the other price (see figure 5).
However when the economy is better integrated and if wage in sector 2 falls
rapidly when that sector is forced to absorb labor displaced from the unionized
sector, then union wages may decline in terms of both prices. This may happen
if θ ≤ η ≤ 1. In this model neo-classical ambiguity is resolved because price
changes also induce endowment changes. When θ is low these endowment changes
may be large enough to make union wages decline unambiguously. Thus union
determined wages are more vulnerable to price changes in industries where capital
is very footloose.
The other change happens in terms of the probability that a union member
finds a job in the unionized sector. The mathematical solution to the change in
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Clearly when θ is greater than one, employment probability rises when union
product price falls. This result is mainly because even as employment falls in
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the unionized sector, the queue of workers wanting to join the union falls even
faster. In more integrated economies where θ is less than one, we cannot make
a prediction about π in general. However in the special case where θ ≤ η ≤
1, employment probability falls even as union real wages fall. Thus in such
industries, liberalization proves doubly costly for the union.
Proposition 6 Wages in the non-unionized sector decline in terms of their own
price. This decline is higher (i) the higher the share of labor in total costs in the
unionized sector, and (ii) the lower θ is. The effect is ambiguous in terms of the
unionized sector’s product price,
The impact on the real outside wage can be estimated as follows:
















Wages in sector 2 fall due to trade liberalization which affects the unionized
sector because it is forced to accept displaced labor from that sector. Thus how
fast outside wages fall depend on how much this displacement is, which in turn
depends on two factors mentioned above. Note that though the union wage falls
slower than its product price for all θ greater than unity, the same result may
not hold for outside wages. The union is able to do this only at the cost of
employment. Workers thus move to sector 2 and drive down wages there. The
union is thus able to transfer more of the pressure of liberalization to wages in
the non-unionized sector of the economy when it confronts lower levels of capital
mobility itself.
Note that in the special case where capital mobility is completely restricted
(θ is infinitely high), wages in both the sectors fall in terms of p, but rise in terms
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of sector 2’s price. In this case, the model displays the neoclassical ambiguity
characteristic of such models. At the other extreme, with full capital mobility,
domestic rental rates are fixed to international rates and cannot vary. Wages
thus have to shoulder the entire burden of adjusting to price declines, and have
to change more than proportionately with prices. Thus capital mobility hurts all
wages unambiguously in this situation.
Corollary 1 Greater capital mobility magnifies the impact of a change in the
unionized sector’s price on wages. When capital is immobile, all wages respond
less than proportionately to a fall in price. When capital is freely mobile, however,
wages fall faster than prices.
Taking the limit of expression 2.15 as θ→∞, it is easy to see that,
−1 ≤ bω/bp = bw2 − bpbp = − 1(1 + η/α) < 0
Applying the limit θ→ 0 to the solution for wages implies that
bω/bp = bw2 − bpbp = α1− α > 0
The reason that wages unambiguously decline in real terms, even in a specific
factor model is that in this model price changes also lead to endowment changes,
because by affecting the rate of return on capital they induce changes in domestic
investment levels. When capital is not easily mobile, domestic investment is not
that responsive and thus the neo-classical ambiguity characteristic of such models
is preserved. However when capital is more mobile domestic investment changes
are enough to make wages decline in terms of both prices.
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It is also instructive to see that both wages move together in both of these
extremes. This implies that the difference between the rates of change in both
the wages is due to the elasticity effect. An important question in this respect
may be how the inter-industry wage differential responds to changes in capital
mobility. From 2.15 and 2.16, the effect on the wage gap can be expressed as:













´ ≶ 0 as 1 ≶ θ
Corollary 2 Union induced inter-industry wage gap rises as union product price
falls if θ > 1, and declines if θ < 1
Thus the union can successfully raise the wage gap, even as demand for its
product falls, so long as it is relatively hard for capital to move out of the sector.
However when capital is mobile enough, and θ < 1, falling product prices increase
the employment cost of keeping union wages high, and this forces the union to
bring wages in its sector closer to the outside wage.
2.5 Conclusions and further research
This chapter examined how wages respond to globalization in a unionized econ-
omy. The major results in this paper are driven by a special general equilibrium
spillover between the two sectors of the economy, where the union bases its wage
demand on wages in the non-unionized sector. The union’s wage demand depends
upon the labor demand elasticity it faces. In this set-up I show that greater cap-
ital market integration may raise sectoral labor demand elasticity. However, I
show that this does not necessarily translate into a fall in the wage either in
44
the non-unionized sector or even in the unionized sector wage. This depends on
whether capital mobility promotes domestic investment or not, and on how large
the union distortion is. It may also benefit union workers in some instances by
increasing their chances of finding union jobs. When the unionized industry loses
capital to markets abroad, integration negatively affects the union both by in-
creasing labor demand elasticity and by reducing union employment. This forces
a decline in union wages. Though such mobility hurts unions, it also provides a
cushion to the general wage level through generating additional employment in
the economy. Workers may gain from enhanced capital mobility when the jobs
lost due to capital outflows are small compared to the new employment opportu-
nities created by the collapse of union wages. When the industry is the recipient
of capital inflows, greater integration promotes larger capital inflows, raises em-
ployment, and tends to pull up the non-union wage in the economy. We show
that if capital inflows are large enough, even union wages might rise. Thus even
while confirming Rodrik’s proposition regarding elasticity, we show that there is
no a priori reason to assume that capital mobility is always detrimental to worker
interests.
Closer product market competition is modeled in the paper as a decline in
the price of the union sector product. Contrary to Rodrik (1998), I show that
price changes do not have a direct impact on labor demand elasticity, but affect
it indirectly by changing domestic investment levels. At a fixed product wage,
elasticity may go up or down depending on the extent of capital market integra-
tion. I show that when domestic firms are not well integrated with world capital
markets, union wages fall less than price and the effect on real wages is ambigu-
ous. At the same time union members benefit from decreased unemployment.
45
Better integration with world capital markets cuts into the ability of the union to
protect itself from product price declines. I show that workers are affected more
by liberalization when capital can escape abroad more easily. Interestingly when
capital is freely mobile, the neo-classical ambiguity disappears and all wages fall
in terms of both good prices.
Many important avenues of research remain. In this model, I assume that both
unions and workers have perfect information regarding the conditions facing the
firm. In reality however, such information is not likely to be available to them,
especially as far as the firms’ outside options are concerned. Firms might be able
to pressurize unions by misrepresenting their returns from relocating. Seniority is
important in many unions when deciding who gets laid off. Thus unemployment
probability might differ across members. The solution in this case might be better
modeled as a political process as in Grossman (1984). This model also assumes
mobility costs to be exogenous to the model, and identical whether capital comes
into or flows out of the economy. A more probable situation might be that
costs differ in both these situations. To the extent that these costs are partially
determined by government policies, they might also be determined through a
political economy process in which workers and firms lobby the government for
protection. Mobility costs might then be endogenized by relating them to the
economy’s endowment relative to the rest of the world. Another avenue for
research would be to model such a process explicitly.
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Chapter 3
An Empirical Study of the effects of Integration
on Union Wage Premiums
3.1 Introduction
Though it is a common belief that globalization has had a profound effect on em-
ployment, incomes and labor market institutions in the participating countries,
the exact nature and extent of this change is poorly understood. One particular
concern, especially in the industrialized countries, has been the effect of interna-
tionalization on workers compensations and employment prospects. Indeed the
fear that workers, especially unskilled workers, have been badly hurt by global-
ization has become a strong argument against further integration. Attention has
also become focused in particular on the effects this can have on labor market
institutions which impact wage determination. Labor markets are often charac-
terized by non competitive wage setting, where wages are determined through
such institutions. Studies in the US, for example, point towards large and persis-
tent inter-industry differentials in wages earned by seemingly equivalent workers.
While there is no consensus over what these differentials represent, at least in
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some industries like automobiles and steel, they might reflect rent seeking by
organized labor unions.
It could be argued that integration may have larger effects on wages and
employment in unionized markets than in competitive markets. The previous
chapter presented a theoretical analysis examining this issue. In this chapter we
empirically explore how important the threat effect unions face from outward
foreign direct investment by their industry is in explaining differences in union
wage premiums across industries and over time. We also examine the nature of
union wage response to tariff protection, and whether this response is affected by
the size of the threat effect they face. We do this by combining worker level data
for the US obtained from the Current Population Surveys for the years 1990-1996,
with industry level data on openness and other industry characteristics. Our
study is different from previous literature in some important respects. Firstly, in
terms of how we define and estimate the industry union wage premium. These are
estimated as the wage differential that union members obtain over similar non-
members in the same industry. Previous studies have interpreted this as either as
differentials earned by union members dependent on their industry of origin, or as
the premium earned by union members over an estimated “general” wage level.
Secondly, we use the share of industry capital invested in the US to the total
worldwide industry capital stock, as the measure of the threat unions face from
outward foreign direct investment. To the extent that FDI is the link connecting
home and foreign labor markets, this may arguably be a better measure than
looking at employment shares. Thirdly, we check for whether union response to
changes in trade policy measures (tariffs) differs systematically with the level of
the threat effect they face.
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In line with theory, after controlling for industry and time fixed-effects, we
find evidence of a threat effect operating on unions. Unions were able to charge
higher premiums in industries that were mostly domestically invested than in
industries that had significant amount of capital invested abroad. We also find
evidence that union response to tariff changes vary with the level of the threat
effect. Tariffs (lagged one year) were negatively related with union premiums
for more domestically invested industries, but positively related with them for
industries that were heavily invested abroad. This suggests that unions respond
to protection by compressing premiums in less mobile industries, and by raising
them in more mobile industries.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into four sections. Section 3.2
presents a review of earlier work. Section 3.3 describes the data, and lays out the
statistical model we use. Section 3.4 presents the results and Section 3.5 provides
a brief conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
Theory suggests that the wage and employment response to labor market pres-
sures can differ under collective bargaining compared with the competitive wage
determination case. This is because unlike in the latter case, unions can choose
which of their two objectives to adjust, generating employment for its members or
maintaining a wage premium over their competitive level. In response to market
pressures, they can therefore adjust their wage demands either less than propor-
tionately at the cost of reducing employment, or more than proportionately to
preserve union jobs. The exact choice they make has been the subject of some
theoretical research.
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The belief that unions face a threat from the growing internationalization of
production is well established in the literature. 1 The pressure that this generates
should lead them to reduce union wage premiums. Increasing import competition
is another channel through which unions may face pressure. Brander and Spencer
(1988) and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) model union-firm interaction in a
Nash bargaining framework, and show that tariff protection allow unions to collect
part of the increased firm level rents for its members in the form of higher wages.
The relationship between tariffs and union wages in their models is thus positive.
Other models, however, predict a more complex relationship. Grossman (1984)
models a union where members are subject to seniority layoffs. He shows that
declines in the product price (for example, due to increased import competition)
generate a conflict between the interests of the marginal member who wants
to lower wages to maintain his probability of getting employment, and the new
median voter in a shrunken union, whose seniority and preferred wage are higher.
He shows the outcome of a vote depends on the elasticity of labor demand facing
the union. Unions facing an elastic labor demand are more likely to vote for wage
increases, but if labor demand is inelastic, union wages fall with declining prices.
Tariffs and union wages may therefore be either positively or negatively related
with each other. A similar result is also derived by Lawrence and Lawrence (1985)
in a different context. They show that declining industries may be characterized
by perverse union wage responses to price declines, as the union tries to extract
maximum rents at the cost of firm profitability. Unions can do this since firm
capacity is largely fixed in the short run.
1See for example, Mezetti and Dinopoulous (1991), Zhao (1995), Rodrik (1999), Reddy
(2000)
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In the previous chapter, we set up a theoretical model that combined some of
the essence of the Grossman (1984) and Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) models in
a general equilibrium framework. The model predicted that the easier it is for an
industry to shift production abroad and out of the reach of local unions, the higher
is the price, in terms of employment, to the union of raising wages. Thus unions in
more mobile industries should charge lower premiums over the competitive wage
rate. This is the ”threat effect” posed by the internationalization of production.
Another prediction of the model was that union premiums would rise as tariff
protection is lowered in industries that are not very mobile internationally, but
that they would fall in the case of more mobile industries. Analogous to the
Lawrence and Lawrence model (1985), unions opt to raise premium in the first
case, in a bid to extract maximum rents from firms that are ”stuck” at home
and face limited ability to reduce employment. Allowing firms to be mobile
internationally, however, changes union incentives. Now the unions fear losing too
many jobs if they keep wages as high as before and companies shift production
abroad. They therefore bear a greater part of the burden of greater import
competition, and reduce wages faster than competitive wages are changing.
Empirical evidence regarding the effect of import competition on union rents
is mixed. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) use aggregate US industry level data
for the period 1980-84, and show that import penetration has a negative effect on
wages, but found the response of union and non-union wages to be similar, possi-
bly implying little change in union premiums. Other indirect evidence comes from
literature that examines the impact of openness on inter-industry wage differen-
tials for union and non-union workers. Freeman and Katz (1991) use worker level
data between 1974-1984, and find that import shares have a significant negative
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effect on inter-industry wage differentials for union members, but not on industry
differentials calculated from the pool of non-union members. A similar result is
reported by Gaston and Trefler (1995), who look at differentials for a cross-section
of industries in 1984. They find that while inter-industry wages differentials for
union members are significantly and negatively related to industry tariffs and
import penetration levels, non-union wage differentials are not. Their study is
also significant because apart from the usual trade openness variables, they also
introduce variables related to a firm’s ability to send production abroad. They
do not, however, find these to be statistically significant in their sample. These
studies do not explicitly look at union premiums, but are suggestive of a negative
relationship between union premiums and openness. In contrast, Pizer (2000)
also examines inter-industry wage differentials in union and non-union samples
for a later period, 1984 to 1991. He surprisingly reports that for union members,
mean industry differentials are positively related to import penetration, while
the relationship is statistically insignificant for non-union members. Further, for
union members, the relationship is strongest when capacity utilization is low in
the industry. This result suggests a relationship between openness and premiums
that is opposite to the one suggested by similar earlier studies.
Other evidence comes from studies that estimate wage equations for the pool
of union and non-union workers. MacPherson and Stewart (1990) pool worker
level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1975-1981,
and estimated separate union and non-union wage equations. They report that
increasing import penetration by 10 percent lowered the average union non-union
wage differential in their sample by around 2 percent. However, a different result
is reported by Shippen and Lynch (2002). They conduct a similar exercise for a
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later time period from 1987-1994, and find that the effect of import penetration
on both union and non-union wages over the entire period was zero. In their
sample, import penetration did negatively affect union wages in the early part of
their time period, however by the mid 90s, this effect vanished.
Cebula and Nair-Reichart (2000) focus explicitly on union premiums (rather
than wages) in their study of workers’ wages from 1975-1984. Their finding is
that union rents are sensitive to import competition, and that this responsive-
ness is not different for different levels of industry unionization. They do not
however focus on the threat effect of firm mobility. Choi (2001) extends their
study for the period 1983-1996, and also looks for the ”threat effect” posed by
foreign direct investment abroad. In his sample, however, import penetration has
no significant impact on union wage premiums. He however documents that the
stock of outward foreign direct investment, measured as the employment share
of majority owned foreign affiliates in US industry employment, has a dampen-
ing effect on union premiums. On the whole, empirical evidence is mixed, and
seems to suggest that union response to import competition and foreign direct
investment may have been different in the early 80s compared to the 90s.
Of these studies, the Cebula-Nair Reichart (2000) study, and the Choi (2001)
study most directly focus on our variable of interest, the union non-union wage
premium. However our study is different from these papers in some important
respects.
(1) We use a different measure of union wage premium. We define the pre-
mium as the extra wage a worker earns because of his union affiliation over an
equivalent worker in the same industry. The previous studies estimate union rents
as the premium over some estimated average wage. We think that this is a better
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measure of union rents, since the persistence of inter-industry wage differences
and the lack of equilibrating labor movements suggests that worker may have
some affinity to their industry, and mobility between industries may be limited.
It is also more likely that unions consider non-union wages in their own industry
as a base in setting their own wages.
(2)We use the share of industry capital invested in the US to the total industry
capital stock worldwide as a measure of the threat that unions face from outward
investment. This share is labeled FDI. A high value of the FDI variable suggests
greater domestic orientation of the industry, and lower threat to domestic unions
from FDI. The use of this measure is suggested by our theoretical model. The
chosen FDI variable may take a high value either because high barriers to mobility
make it difficult for firms to shift capacities abroad to take advantage of better
conditions there. These barriers could be in the form of high costs of shutting
down domestic capacity in the case of declining industries, or high fixed costs of
starting operations in foreign locations. In either case, domestic unions face less
threat of their jobs being exported abroad. Alternatively a high value of the FDI
variable might reflect the relatively attractiveness of the US as a production center
compared to locations abroad. In this case, relatively more capital will be invested
at home than is invested abroad by domestic firms. 2 Using capital shares rather
than employment shares at home and abroad might be a better (albeit imperfect)
measure of the threat effect, since the threat to domestic employment from foreign
workers must be intermediated by domestic industries making capital investments
2Note that our measure also incorporates inward foreign direct investment, since the more




(3) We also include trade policy variables like tariffs, along with trade volume
based openness indictors. We also check for whether the impact of tariff changes
on union premiums, is different across industries where unions face different levels
of threat effects.
(4) There may be simultaneity issues with our openness indicators, the FDI
variable, tariffs and union premiums. Higher union premiums may force more
capital out, and raise the threat variable (FDI). Similarly if import competition
from abroad forces union premiums down, this may lead to increased lobbying by
unions for protection. To the extent that causality runs from openness to premi-
ums however, this can be avoided to some extent when we test the relationship
with lagged openness variables. In our study therefore we test the relationship
between current union premiums, and lagged openness indicators. This approach
may also be justified on the ground that it might take some time for changes in
labor market conditions to get reflected in union negotiated wages.
3.3 Specification and Data
Analyzing the impact of globalization indices on union premiums requires us to
match worker level data with industry level characteristics. This is done by merg-
ing four data sets together: (1) The Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG)
of the current population extracted by the NBER, (2) the NBER Manufacturing
Productivity Database, (3) US Trade by 1987 SIC Category, 1989-2001, provided
by the NBER, and (4) US Direct Investment Abroad provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The time period of the study, 1990-96 is dictated in part by
the availability of data. This period is also interesting because this was when the
55
Uruguay Round of GATT was passed, and import competition was increasing in
virtually every manufacturing industry.
Though most data is available at a very disaggregated level, the publicly avail-
able foreign direct investment data is provided for only 32 broad classifications.
Of these, two categories (electrical machinery and electric components and acces-
sories) are not separated in the CPS data, and are merged together in our data
set. This requires us to aggregate all data into 31 industry groups. This is done
with the help of the concordances provided in the data sets themselves. Due care
has been taken to ensure consistency at every step. Details of SIC industry codes
included under each classification are given in Table 3.
Estimation is done in two stages. In the first stage we estimate our variable of
interest, the industry union/non-union premium. Estimating this differential has
been a source of debate in the literature because of fears that union status may
be correlated with unobserved worker characteristics.3 However since our pri-
mary concern is in explaining changes in the union premium over time, following
Blanchflower and Bryson (2002) we do not control for this potential endogenity
under the assumption that any resulting bias in our estimates remains constant
over time. OLS is used to estimate the following log wage equation using data
from the NBER MORG data set from 1990 to 1996.
3The direction of the relationship is however unclear. One possibility is that workers with
lower underlying earning capacity have more to gain from union membership than higher quality
workers. Union premiums estimated on the basis of observed characteristics will be underes-
timates of the real premium in this case. Alternatively there is also the possibility that the
queuing that occurs because of positive union premiums, allows employers to choose the best
workers among those the available pool of applicants, in which case estimated union premiums
are overestimates.
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ln(wit) = αt + βtXijt + δjtDj+γjt (Dj ∗ Uijt) + εit
Where wit is real hourly wage of worker ”i” employed in industry ”j” in time
t, defined as the usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. Xijt is a
vector of worker, location and demographic characteristics, including schooling,
labor force experience4 and its square, full time or part time status, gender,
race, marital status, geographic location dummies and veteran status. Dj is a
vector of industry dummies and Uijt is a dummy indicating the ith workers union
membership. εit is a well-behaved random error term. There is some disagreement
about whether occupational dummies should be included in the wage equation
(see Blanchflower and Bryon, 2002). We therefore also estimate a separate set
of estimates which include (12) occupational dummies. The excluded industry
group is non-union members in the textile products and apparel industry. The
sample of workers included in the study includes workers between the ages of
16-76 who (1) were employed in the private sector, (2) were employed in the
manufacturing sector except the petroleum industry5, (3) worked for more than
an hour a week, and (4) earned more than $1 and less than $250 an hour.
A major shortcoming in the data is that it only reports wages, and not other
non-wage benefits. This may bias our results, if for example, union members
regularly receive more of their total compensation is the form of non-wage benefits
than union members. In this case, our union premium would be underestimated.
However our results may still be useful if we can assume that the composition of
total compensation remains unchanged over time for both union and non-union
4Labor force experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus 6
5BEA data on outward FDI does not distinguish between the petroleum refining industry
and petroleum mining industry. Since the study is limited to just the manufacturing sector, we
drop all workers from this industry from our sample.
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members. Since our study covers a period of just six years, this assumption,
though bold, may still give reasonable results.
We interpret as the premium enjoyed by a union member over a non-union
worker in the same industry, which is not explained by observed worker character-
istics.6 In the second step, we regress these estimated premiums on industry-level
variables including the capital-labor ratio, average establishment size, industry
profitability,7 unionization levels, a measure of technological change and industry
openness indices like tariff protection levels, import penetration, export intensity
and foreign direct investment. The same set of regressions are also run for the
second set of estimates obtained by including occupational dummies. The model
we estimate is given below:
γjt=µj + η1(K/Lratio)t + η2(Size)t+ η3(profitability)t−1 + η4 (technology
proxy)t+η5(tariffs)t−1+η6(import penetration)t−1+η7 (expor tintensity)t−1+
η8 (FDI)t−1 + λt + ωjt
The use of some of these variables is suggested by our monopoly-union model.
Others are controls suggested by rent-sharing models and have been employed
6This approach is similar to that used by Cebula and Nair-Reichart (2000) and Choi (2001)
to calculate union rents. However they interpret their coefficients on the interaction term
differently. They consider it to be the wage differential a union member in an industry receives
in comparison to a worker in the excluded industry.
7We follow Pizer (2000) in constructing profitability as (sales + change in inventories +
investment -payroll - energy cost - cost of raw materials - 0.18*capital)/ (sales + change in
inventories + investment). An alternative measure of industry rents is also included based on
the method employed by Leamer et al. (2000) where rents are the constructed as the residuals
obtained by running the regression below for the cross-section of industries in every time period.
This yields results that are similar to those obtained using the first method, and are not reported
in this paper.
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in previous studies. These include a measure of industry profitability, and the
average establishment size.8 Technology might also be important in explaining
union premiums. It could be that industries that employ new technology and
highly skilled labor may be able to pay unions higher premiums than more mature
industries (Pizer 2000). To check for this, we include a measure of technological
change, where technological change in an industry is proxied by the share of
scientists and engineers employed in that industry.9 This is calculated using
information from MORG data on worker occupation.
Trade policy is measured by the average industry tariff level. These are cal-
culated from the NBER trade data. We also include import penetration and
export intensity indices as proxies for industry openness to trade to make them
comparable to earlier studies. The use of both tariffs and import penetration
in the same regression has been justified by Gaston and Trefler (1994). We in-
clude both on the grounds that not all changes in import penetration may result
only from changes in the tariff levels. For example if productivity rises faster in
foreign exporting firms than in domestic import competing firms, or if foreign
wages go down, import penetration may rise even if domestic tariff levels remain
fixed. Similarly outward foreign direct investment by domestic industries to take
advantage of cost conditions abroad and subsequent import to meet domestic
demand, may also lead to changes in trade intensities without any change in the
tariff level. We interpret the coefficient on import penetration as reflecting the
threat that unions face from increasing displacement of domestic production by
8This is obtained by dividing the total employment obtained from the NBER manufacturing
productivity database by the total number of establishments in each industry obtained from
the Economic Census.
9This measure has also been used in previous studies such as Choi (2001).
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imports.
The variable we choose for measuring the threat effect to domestic workers
(labeled FDI) is the share of industry capital invested in the US to the total
industry capital invested either at home or abroad in majority-owned foreign
affiliates (MOFA). 10 This measure is suggested by our theoretical model, and
may be a better measure to use than employment shares to the extent that
employment flows are intermediated by capital flows. The FDI variable is a
composite measure of the advantages of investing abroad to local industry, and
the costs of doing so. As noted before, this variable may take a high value because
high barriers to mobility make it difficult for firms to establish facilities abroad
to take advantage of better conditions there, or if investing abroad is not very
attractive. This would suggest that unions face a lower threat. On the other
hand, the higher the capacity an industry has established abroad„ the larger is
its ability to threaten domestic unions with shifting employment abroad. This
should make the union tone down its wage demands, and have a negative effect
on union premiums. In general high values of this variable suggest low threat
to unions, and when this variable takes a low value, unions are more vulnerable.
Another feature of this variable is that it can also take account of inward foreign
direct investment. Thus if the US is relatively attractive as a production center
compared to locations abroad, the US may attract larger inward foreign direct
investment. These will raise the value the FDI variable by raising the share of
domestic capital. Domestic unions then face a lower threat effect, and this should
enable them to raise premiums.
10MOFA are defined by the BEA as those foreign affiliates where the US parent holds at least
a 50% stake.
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Our theoretical model predicts different effects of changes in tariffs on short
run union premiums depending on the degree of mobility available to firms in an
industry and the consequent threat to the union. This, however, is not directly
observable. As an approximation, we label industry-years in the top 45 percentile
of the FDI variable as ones where unions face a low threat from outward FDI.
Industry-years in the bottom 45 percentile of the FDI variable are classified as
ones where unions faced a high threat from the possibility of industries shifting
employment abroad. To check if union responses to trade policy changes are
indeed different, we interact a dummy for an industries mobility in the last year
with lagged tariffs.
One difficulty in estimating the postulated relationship, stems from the pos-
sible simultaneity between trade policy and union premiums. It is possible that
declining wage premiums in the face of labor demand shocks lead unions to lobby
for, and obtain higher protection. Cebula and Nair-Reichart (2000) use a 2SLS
technique to solve this problem. Pizer (2000) suggests using lagged trade policy
to highlight the direction of causality. We employ his methodology, with the
added justification that it might take some time for the effects of international
competition to get fully reflected in union premiums since the negotiation process
are typically long and happen periodically.
Since the dependent variables are first-stage estimates, the residuals in this
regression may be heteroskedastic. Robust standard errors are therefore used
for making inferences. Year effects are included since union premiums may be
correlated with macroeconomic fluctuations not otherwise captured. Industry
fixed effects are included to take account of permanent but unobserved industry
characteristics that are correlated with both union premiums and trade policy,
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such as political clout. Finally we test for the validity of including these industry
effects by estimating the same regression using the random effects model, and
comparing the two with a Hausman test.
3.4 Findings
In general, manufacturing industries in the US became more open between 1990
and 1996. This is true whether openness is measured in terms of falling tariffs, in-
creasing import penetration or export intensity. 11 The international orientation
of most industries also went up, with the share of domestically invested capi-
tal in total industry capital falling on the average, after initially rising between
1991 and 1994 (Figure 6). The industries that witnessed the largest declines in
this share were the Beverage industry, Farm and garden machinery, Electrical
and Electronic components and accessories industry, and the Motor Vehicles and
Equipment industry. The FDI variable went up only for a handful of industries
with the largest increase being in the Household appliances, and Office and com-
puting machines industry. There is significant variation in the FDI variable, both
across industries and over time.
The average estimated union premiums also showed significant variation over
this period, with a positive trend between 1991 to 94, followed by a decline (Fig-
ure 7). One issue with our first stage estimates is that not all the coefficients are
measured with the same degree of precision. A bigger concern is that some of our
11Import penetration went down over the sample period for only two industries: Motor
Vehicles and Equipment, and Farm and Garden Machinery. Export intensity decreased for three
industries: Agricultural Chemicals, Tobacco Manufactures, and the Lumber, Wood, Furnitures
and Fixtures industry.
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estimates of union premium turn out to be negative, implying union members
earn less wages than their non-union members counterparts in the same industry.
Most of these negative coefficients are not statistically different from zero, but
for three industries the average union premium is estimated to be negative and
significant for some years. These are the Drugs, Office and Computing Machines
and the Household audio and video and communication equipment industries.
One possible explanation for this is that union premiums in these industries may
be small, and a larger part of the compensation for union workers may be in
terms of non-wage benefits that are not captured in our data. The high degree
of industry aggregation may also be to blame. If there are inter-industry wage
differentials between the industry sub-groups aggregated together and if union-
ization differs significantly across them, the estimated premium might partially
reflect these differentials rather than the true union premium..
Some results from our first stage regressions are tabulated in Table 2. These
show industries with the highest and lowest average union premiums in our sam-
ple. As the table indicates, industries that had high union premiums tended to
be ones that had larger plants (in terms of employment), were less exposed to
trade, more heavily invested in the home market, and were also technologically
more mature. They also tended to have, on the average, lower levels of tariff
protection than industries with low union rents.
Estimated union premiums also show variation within industries over time. In
slightly more than half of the industries, average union premiums in the last three
years of the sample were higher than the average in the first three years. Premi-
ums went up in some important industries like the Motor Vehicles and Equipment
industry, Ferrous Metals and metal products industry, Paper and allied products,
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and the Construction and mining machinery industry. Union premiums declined
in other industries like printing and publishing, and the Lumber, Wood Furniture
and Fixtures industry. Indication that a threat effect may be in operation comes
from the Lumber, Wood Furniture and Fixtures industry where union premiums
declined as industries shifted more of their capital abroad. However the opposite
seems to be true of the Motor Vehicles and Equipment industry, which despite
witnessing the largest percentage decline in the share of domestic capital could
also increase union premiums significantly.
As a first step we try to verify the implications of Gaston and Trefler’s (1995)
findings by regressing the estimated union premiums on a mix of industry char-
acteristics and openness indicators without removing industry or time fixed ef-
fects12. These specifications do not include all of their variables, but we replicate
some of their key results. These results are presented in the first column of ta-
ble 4. Import penetration, for example, has a negative effect on union premium
(though this is significant only at the 15% level in our sample), while export
intensity is positively associated. The positive coefficient on lagged profits also
seems to suggest some sort of rent-sharing. We also replicate their most interest-
ing result, the negative coefficient on lagged tariffs, which seems to imply that
higher protection is associated with lower union premiums. The threat effect also
appears to be important, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient in
front of the lagged FDI threat variable.
A problem with the Gaston and Trefler paper is that, being a purely cross-
sectional study, they could not correct for industry or time fixed effects. Industry
12Similar results are obtained from regressions run on premium estimates obtained by includ-
ing occupational dummies. These are not presented here, but are available with the author.
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fixed effects are needed to correct for permanent and unobserved industry char-
acteristics that are correlated both with wages and openness indicators. For
example if high wage industries are also industries which can more successfully
lobby for higher protection, then not including industry fixed effects would bias
our openness coefficients. Once we do this, the results change significantly (col-
umn 2). 13 A Hausman test on our sample also strongly suggests the inclusion
of these industry controls. The coefficient on tariffs, despite remaining negative,
becomes much less significant. Other openness indicators also do not appear to
have much explanatory power. Industry characteristics like the capital to labor
ratio, plant size, lagged unionization indicator and the technological change in-
dicator alone retain their significance in explaining union wage premiums. Thus
contrary to their assertion, Gaston and Trefler’s results are very sensitive to the
addition of these industry effects.
However these results are biased if we do not account for the possibility that
union wage premiums responding in systematically different ways to tariff changes
depending on the level of the threat effect. To check for this prediction, we divide
industry-years into ”high threat” and ”low threat” group, depending on the value
that our threat indicator took in the preceding year. Industry-years in the top
45th percentile of the FDI threat indicator are classified as facing a low threat
from FDI, while those in the bottom 45th percentile are classified as facing a
high threat. Some of the industries that were in the high threat category over
13Industry fixed effects are controlled for at the two-digit SIC level. Given the degree of
aggregation in our data, this seems most appropriate. Similar results are obtained if industry
effects are introduced for each industry classification in our sample, but given our small number
of observations and the large number of coefficients to be estimated, all coefficients are measured
with less precision.
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the entire time period of our study were Tobacco manufacturing, Motor Vehicles
and Equipment industry, the Office & Computing, and the Soaps, Cleaners and
Toilet Goods industries. Industries like Printing and Publishing, Ferrous metals,
Fabricated metal products and the Agricultural Chemicals industries faced the
least threat from outward foreign direct investment. We interact the dummy for
the threat category in the preceding year with the lagged tariff, and rerun the
regression. The results are presented in column 3 of table 4. Since our regressand
is estimated, we also run the regression weighting observations by the standard
error of union premium estimates from the first stage regressions (column 5).
The addition of the interaction terms improves the fit of the regression and
the R square. However even under the new specification, we do not find any
significant effect of trade volumes on union premium. This suggests that while
trade flows might influence the level of both union and non-union wages, the
effect is similar for both. This finding is consistent with the results obtained in
some earlier studies looking at union behavior over the same time period (Choi,
2001, Shippen and Lynch 2002).
At the same time, the FDI variable itself continues to be positively and sig-
nificantly related to union premiums: unions in industries with lower levels of
investment abroad were able to raise wages higher than unions in industries with
more foreign investment. The size of the threat effect is quite large: holding
everything else the same, unions in the Ferrous Metal Industry (with the least
outward FDI) could charge a 8%-13% higher premium for their members than
the premium for union members in the Soaps, Cleaners and Toilet Goods indus-
try (the most heavily internationally invested industry in the sample), just on
account of their industry having less outward FDI. However the effect is small
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in comparison to other industry characteristics like the capital-labor ratio and
technological change in the industry.
The results also support our supposition that the level of threat from FDI
has a significant impact on union response. We find that the coefficient on the
interaction terms between the threat dummies and tariffs have different signs for
the high threat and the low threat groups, and are significant. This coefficient
is positive for industries facing a high threat from outward FDI, suggesting that
tariff reductions lead to declines in union wage premiums. This could happen
as unions reduce wages to maintain employment, and bear part of the burden of
liberalization. The response is exactly opposite for industries where outward FDI
is small. Here the coefficient on the interaction term is negative, implying that
tariff reductions in the past year cause current union premiums to go up. This
is consistent with the ”slow game” interpretation of Lawrence and Lawrence
(1985) and our theoretical model, where unions raise premiums in the face of
declining prices, even at the cost of employment, to take advantage of industries
that are stuck at home. These results may also be consistent with the positive
effect of import penetration on mean union industry differentials noticed by Pizer
(2000). He reports that this effect is limited to industry-years where there was
low capacity utilization, and does not appear when the sample consists of high
utilization industry-years. To the extent that low capacity utilization may reflect
industry capacity ”stuck” at home, his results may support our findings.
It might be that our results about the effects of trade policy arise from our
choice of industry classification. One possibility is that our results are driven
by a few industries that dominate the high or low threat classification, and the
regression is capturing some industry characteristic responses. To check this we
67
choose an alternative division, dividing each industry into high or low threat
categories based on their ranking in the first year of our sample. If industry
specific effects alone are driving our results, this classification should yield the
same, or even stronger results, than our base case. This regression however
does not yield any statistically significant coefficients for the interaction terms,
suggesting that this is not the case (column 6, table 4). Another possibility is
that the base classification might be dividing industries on the basis of time,
and capturing some time-specific effects of trade policy. We therefore choose an
alternative methodology, classifying industries in the lowest 45% percentile of
the FDI variable in each year as high threat industries, and those in the highest
45% in each year as low threat industries. This categorization produces results
that are qualitatively and numerically similar to our earlier results, though the
coefficients on the interactions terms do not turn out to be statistically significant
(column 7, Table 4). This is understandable since the threat from outward FDI
should not be dependent on relative industry positions, but on the threat faced
by each industry. However this also confirms our belief that the results are not
driven by purely time-specific effects.
For industry controls other than the openness indicators, the findings of our
study are consistent with other studies. Across all specifications, the capital to
labor ratio has a positive and significant coefficient, implying higher union pre-
miums in more capital intensive industries. In most regressions, the coefficient
on average plant employment is negative and significant. The extent of union-
ization also appears to positively affect union premiums, though the coefficient
is not always statistically significant. Previous studies have also found a similar
union-threat effect (Choi 2001). Interestingly lagged industry profitability does
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not seem to have any significant effect on industry union premiums. This result
is similar to the findings in Pizer (2000) and Choi (2001).
One industry characteristic that is an economically large and statistically sig-
nificant factor explaining union premiums is our proxy for technological change.
Industries that employ a larger share of scientists and engineers, are also indus-
tries where union premiums tend to be small. This suggests that unions are most
effective in raising wages in more mature industries. However care must be taken
in interpreting this coefficient because this measure could also be proxying for
the industry share of skilled workers. In this case be capturing the effect that
union premiums are lower in more skilled labor-intensive industries.
Our results suggest that while the capital-labor ratio and the technological
change proxy have the largest effect on union premiums, trade policy and outward
FDI also have a significant impact on these. Of the openness indices, while the
threat from outward FDI affects union premiums in all industries, trade policy
changes seem to have the most impact only on industries that are very heavily
invested abroad, or very less so.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper I use worker level data from the CPS-MORG samples to estimate
union wage premiums for 31 industries for the period 1990-1996. I combine these
with industry level data obtained from the NBER trade database, the NBER
productivity database and BEA data on US outward foreign direct investment
to check for the effect of a range of openness indices on the estimated premiums.
I show that after removing industry and time fixed effects, there is evidence
of a relatively strong “threat effect” from outward FDI on union premiums. The
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more heavily an industry was invested abroad, all else remaining the same, the
smaller was the union wage premium in that industry. This shows that the
growing internationalization of production does indeed reduce the ability of local
unions to maintain bargained wages.
I also find strong evidence to suggest that unions may respond in different
ways to trade policy changes depending on the level of the threat effect they face
from outward foreign direct investment. In more domestically invested industries,
tariff reductions lead to higher union premiums for members over similar non-
members, thereby increasing labor market distortions. However, in industries
that are heavily invested abroad, unions respond to tariff reductions by lowering
their wage premiums, presumably to protect employment. To the extent that
most industries in our sample are moving towards greater investment abroad,
this highlights one channel through which international integration can make




Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1













or that holding all else constant, a reduction in capital mobility costs makes
employment more responsive to wages.









Thus when we also consider changes in the efficient capital stock, holding
union wage fixed, the shifted labor demand curve is more elastic
Appendix 2:Effects of a decline in λ
Totally differentiating sector 1 firms’ first order conditions yields the following:
bK = −(1− α
αθ
)bw − (K −K0)
K
bλ
bL = −(1− α+ θ
αθ




The total impact on the union wage demand schedule (VV) can then be
gauged by totally differentiating equation 2.1, using these two conditions above
This yields the following:
Abw +Bbπ = Cbλ (4.1)
where




αθ(θ + 1− α) > 0
B =
(1− β)η





(1 + θ − α)
K0
K
− η (K −K0)
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Similarly totally differentiating the membership constraint yields (MM), yields
the following condition:
D bw +Ebπ = Fbλ (4.2)
where,
D = (1− β + βπ)(1 + η) > 0
E = (1− β)(1 + η) < 0
F = −η((1− β + βπ)(K −K0
K
) ≶ 0asK ≶ K0
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Comparative statics are conducted using Cramer’s Rule.
Appendix 3: Effects of a decline in price
Totally differentiating sector 1 firms’ first order conditions yields the following:










The total impact on the union wage demand schedule (VV) can be gauged
by expressing 2.1 in terms of real wages (ω), and totally differentiating equation
using the above. This yields
Abω +BcM = Gbp
where A, B are the same





(θ + 1− α)θ − 1 +
η
θ
Similarly totally differentiating the membership constraint (2.2), yields the
following condition:
Dbω +EcM = Hbp
where terms D and E are as defined in the previous section, and
H = (1− β + βπ)(−1 + η
θ
) < 0








Table 1: Direct Investment Flows, OECD Countries, 1998-2001 (Billion USD) 
 
  Inflows   Outflows  
 1998 1999 2000 p 2001 e 1998 1999 2000 p 2001 e 
         
Australia 6.1 5.7 11.9 5.1 3.4 3.0 5.1 11.4 
Austria 4.5 3.0 8.8 5.9 2.7 3.3 5.7 3.0 
Belgium-
Luxembourg 
22.7 38.7 243.3 51.0 28.5 34.0 241.2 67.3 
Canada 22.6 25.2 63.3 27.6 34.6 18.4 44.0 37.0 
Czech Republic 3.7 6.3 5.0 4.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Denmark 7.7 6.8 14.5 4.1 4.5 7.0 6.6 6.1 
Finland 12.1 4.6 8.8 3.6 18.6 6.6 24.0 7.3 
France 31.0 47.1 42.9 52.6 48.6 120.6 175.5 82.8 
Germany 24.6 54.8 195.2 31.8 88.8 109.4 49.8 43.3 
Greece .. 0.6 1.1 1.6 n.a. 0.5 2.1 0.6 
Hungary 2.0 2.0 1.6 2.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.3 
Iceland 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Ireland 8.9 19.0 24.1 9.8 3.9 5.4 4.0 5.4 
Italy 4.3 6.9 13.4 14.9 16.1 6.7 12.3 21.5 
Japan 10.2 21.1 29.0 17.9 39.9 65.3 49.8 32.5 
Korea 5.2 10.7 10.1 3.2 3.4 2.1 3.5 2.6 
Mexico 11.9 12.5 14.7 24.7 .. .. .. 3.7 
Netherlands 37.9 31.9 54.3 55.6 38.8 41.5 72.0 44.4 
New-Zealand 1.8 0.9 1.3 3.2 0.4 1.1 0.6 0.7 
Norway 4.0 7.5 6.0 2.2 2.5 5.5 8.3 -1.0 
Poland 6.4 7.3 9.3 6.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Portugal 3.1 1.2 6.4 3.3 3.8 3.2 7.7 5.1 
Slovak Republic 0.5 0.4 2.1 0.6 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.1 
Spain 11.8 15.8 37.5 21.8 18.9 42.1 54.7 27.8 
Sweden 19.6 60.9 23.4 12.9 24.4 21.9 40.6 6.4 
Switzerland 8.9 11.7 16.3 10.0 18.8 33.3 42.7 16.3 
Turkey 1.0 0.8 1.7 3.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.6 
United Kingdom 70.6 82.9 119.7 53.8 121.8 205.8 255.1 39.5 
United States 179.0 289.5 307.7 130.8 142.6 188.9 178.3 127.8 
TOTAL OECD 522.6 775.6 1274.0 565.8 666.7 926.6 1285.6 593.1 
Note: Data are converted using the yearly average exchange rates. 
Source: OECD International Direct Investment Database. 
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Farm & Garden 
Machinery 0.07 50.71 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.95 
Printing & 
Publishing 0.04 24.47 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.98 
Motor Vehicles 
and Equipment 0.11 155.77 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.28 0.15 0.73 
Grain Mill and 
Bakery Products 0.09 58.77 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.90 
Tobacco 
Manufactures 0.21 304.60 0.67 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.15 0.80 
Average 0.10 118.87 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.87 
 



























Drugs 0.13 135.79 0.25 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.70 
Office and 
computing 
Machines 0.11 124.95 0.13 0.24 0.03 0.46 0.39 0.65 
Audio, Video, 
Communication 
Equipment 0.07 108.23 0.11 0.25 0.04 0.37 0.24 0.88 
Soaps, 
Cleaners, Toilet 
Goods 0.10 52.60 0.23 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.65 





Table 3: Industry Classification 
 
Icode Industry Name Constituent SIC 
1 Grain Mill and Bakery Products 204, 205 
2 Beverages 208 
3 Other Food Products 
201, 202, 203, 206, 207, 
209 
4 Industrial Chemicals and Synthetics 281, 282, 286 
5 Drugs 283 
6 Soaps, Cleaners and Toilet Goods 284 
7 Agricultural Chemicals 287 
8 Misc. Chemical Products 285, 289 
9 Ferrous Metals 331, 332, 339 
10 Nonferrous Metals 333, 334, 335, 336 
11 Fabricated Metal Products 34 
12 Farm and Garden Machinery 352 
13 Construction, Mining and Materials handling  353 
14 Office and Computing Machines 357 
15 Misc. Machinery 351, 354, 355, 356,  
  358, 359 
16 Household Appliances 363 
17 Household Audio and Video, and Communication Equipment 365, 366 
18 
Other Electrical Machinery (inc. electronic components and 
accessories) 361, 362, 364, 367, 369
19 Motor Vehicles and Equipment 371 
20 Misc. Transportation Equipment 
372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 
379 
21 Tobacco Manufactures 21 
22 Textile Products and Apparel 22, 23 
23 Lumber, Wood, Furniture and Fixtures 24, 25 
24 Paper and Allied Products 26 
25 Printing and Publishing 27 
26 Rubber Products 301, 302, 305, 306 
27 Misc. Plastic Products 308 
28 Glass Products 321, 322, 323 
29 Stone, Clay and other non-metallic Mineral Products 
324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 
329 
30 Instruments and Related Products 38 





Table 4: Effects of Openness on Estimated Union Wage Premiums 
Specification 1 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 7a
K/L ratio 0.038 0.456** 0.671** 0.620** 0.724** 0.654** 0.493**
  (0.0781) (0.1496) (0.1613) (.1705) (0.1883) (0.2653) (0.1551)
size 0.0003** -0.0002 -0.0003* -.0004** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0005**
  (0.00011) (0.00018) (0.00019) (.0002) (0.0003) (0.00026) (0.0002)
lagged profit 0.089 -0.009 0.145 0.169 0.135 0.221 0.150
  (0.0554) (0.1101) (0.1199) (0.1179) (0.1313) (0.1644) (0.1153)
Lagged 
Unionization 
Rate    0.145 0.123 0.246** 0.212**
     (0.1032) (0.1186) (0.0950) (0.0988)
technology -0.784** -0.776** -0.851** -0.764** -0.562** -0.717** -0.702**
  (0.1017) (0.1380) (0.1264) (0.1447) (0.2080) (0.1467) (0.1404)
lagged tariff -0.916** -0.654 -0.904 -0.575 -0.246 -1.065 -0.352
  (0.1728) (0.5613)) (0.5917) (0.6095) (0.7927) (1.6850) (0.5836)
Lagged 
tariff*low threat    -0.793** -0.727* -0.611 0.310 -0.343
     (0.3948) (0.3964) (0.5230) (1.4064) (0.2752)
Lagged 
Tariff*high 
threat    0.651** 0.522* 0.660* 1.123 0.518
     (0.2980) (0.3141) (0.3874) (1.6702) (0.3337)
lagged export 
Intensity 0.253** -0.008 -0.053 -0.012 -0.237 0.162 0.093
  (0.0913) (0.1770) (0.1622) (0.1779) (0.1942) (0.1504) (0.1721)
lagged import 
Intensity -0.106 -0.0684 -0.030 -0.038 -0.109 -0.182 -0.080
  (0.0690) (0.1191) (0.1112) (0.1085) (0.1482) (0.1531) (0.1126)
lagged Threat 
from FDI 0.213** 0.136 0.353** 0.291** 0.335** 0.165 0.248*
  (0.0758) (0.1032) (0.1127) (0.1248) (0.1464) (0.1204) (0.1275)
Constant -0.087 0.041 -0.155 -0.159 -0.103 -0.077 -0.160
  (0.0788) (.1525) (.1423) (0.1406) (0.1677) (0.1529) (0.1460)
n 176 176 176 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.42 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.70
 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%  






 Figure 1: Equilibrium in the Model
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Figure 4: Effects of Capital Mobility when Firms Import Capital: Effect on 
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